POLITICAL
CORRUPTION: ITS PREVENTION IN TANZANIA
EDWARD G. HOSEAH, DIRECTOR OF INVESTIGATIONS
PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION BUREAU, TANZANIA
ABSTRACT
Corruption had existed in all societies and will continue to be around and the total elimination of corruption will never be worthwhile, but meaningful measures can be taken to limit its reach and contains the harm it causes.
We have also to recognize that corruption has different meanings in deferent societies. One person’s bribe is another person’s gift. A politician or political leader or public official who helps friends, family members, and supporters may seem praiseworthy in some societies and corrupt in others. Culture and history are explanations but not excuses. I contend that the wrong of the past no longer fits modern conditions.
And I conclude with a range of alternatives that reformers must tailor to the conditions in Tanzania. The fundamental changes in the way government does business ought to be at the centre of the reform agenda. The goal should be to reduce the underlying incentives to pay and receive bribes. If the incentives remain unchecked political corruption will be around us for a long time.
THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF
CORRUPTION:
Corruption is a symptom that something has gone
wrong in the management of the state Institutions that are designed to govern
the interrelationships between the citizens and the state are used instead, for
personal enrichment and the provision of benefits to the corruption. Corruption
undermines the legitimacy and effectiveness of government.
Corruption is defined here to mean Monopoly
+ Discretion – Accountability - Transparency in running the affairs of
government and state power in the management of the resources of a country.
Susan Rose – Ackerman argues that:
The government may be
charged with allocating a scarce benefit to individuals and firms using legal
criteria other than willingness to pay.
Bribes clear the market.
Officials in the public
sector may have little incentive to do their jobs well, given official pay
scales and the level of internal monitoring.
They may impose delays
and other roadblocks. Bribes act as
incentive bonuses.
Those engaged in legal
pursuits seek to reduce the costs imposed on them by government in the form of
taxes, customs duties, and regulations.
Bribes lower costs.
Illegal businesses
frequently purchase corrupt benefits from the state. In extreme cases illegal businesses and organized crime bosses
dominate the police and other parts of the state through corruption and
intimidation. Bribes permit criminal
activity[1].
Susan Rose – Ackerman concludes that pervasive
corruption undermines the legitimacy of government. Corruption in the provision of public goods and services and in
the imposition of costs casts a cloud over governments seeking popular
legitimacy[2].
The negative
consequences of corruption are seen to outweigh the benefits of the “greasing”
argument. Corruption at the political level, alienate citizens from the
electoral process and they continue to be voiceless in matters that concern
them.
Corruption distorts the allocation of public
expenditure as a whole. In this case,
there is a bias towards expenditure that is secret and unaccountable,
competition is very low and arms – length prices are hard to determine. As a result there is an increase in fiscal
imbalance.
Corruption is disincentive to investment and it inflates public expenditure unproductively. It reduces overall tax revenue, destroys tax centrality and increased foreign borrowing and debt crisis in the long term. The citizens will continue to suffer as they lack necessary and basic service from the government.
Corruption is ever-present threat in every human society and the important distinguishing factor among human societies, is the different levels of tolerance to corruption.
As
noted above, corruption is not confined to developing countries only, but
frequently corruption is sometimes homegrown but too often is linked to
international business corporations that are seen to have bribed political
leaders and public officials in other countries or to have funded political
parties in a way that threatens the proper working of the democratic process.
Political corruption is normally and involves grand corruption. The concern here is “the misuse of public power for private/personal gain, moral decay, degeneration of values and moral principles. Grand corruption usually involves the giving of a benefit to a political leader or senior public official by a businessman in return for a decision in his favour. Usually something that the leader should not do and that is also likely to be illegal.
The impact of grand corruption is so enormous in society because important decisions are taken by high officials and political leaders responsible for public funds for personal motives and disregarding the consequences to the wider community.
The scandal that led to the resignation of Alberto Fujimori, as President of Peru is a telling story. The tape, obtained by the opposition and released in mid-September of 2000, allegedly showed Peru’s powerful security chief engaging in vote-buying. It shocked the nation and the world. In the video, Vladimiro Montesinos, head of the National Intelligence Service (SIN), was shown apparently handing USD15,000 to opposition congressman Luis Alberto Kowri to switch sides and tilt the balance to give the government a majority in Parliament[3].
Another political corruption scandal is in relation to Abacha’s cash hidden in UK. General Aliyu Mohamed, national security adviser to President Olusegun Obasanjo, flew in London from Lagos to give evidence to MPs on Parliamentary international development committee. He said “We’re concerned about non-cooperation of the British government” that much money in London was given to the Abachas as bribes from British firms seeking contracts in Nigeria. The home office has said that under British law no action could be taken until charges were made. But the High Commissioner of Nigeria reacted by saying that charges had been brought recently.
Part of the problem lies with the mutual legal assistance agreement between the two countries which requires Nigeria to provide clear proof connecting individual Nigerians to the bank account[4].
In another political sleaze in UK, Geoffrey Robinson, the controversial former Minister, was facing a three-week suspension from the House of Commons for misleading MPs over a £200,000 payment from a company owned by disgraced Labour tycoon, Robert Maxwell.
The Commons standards and privileges committee said they regarded the former paymaster general’s behaviour as “a serious breach of the rules of the House” because he had failed to provide MPs with full responses to their questions[5].
In another interesting development in UK, the tenacious official who investigates allegations of misconduct against MPs, Elizabeth Filkin, has been denied reappointment for a second term after falling foul of the Parliamentary establishment at Westminster.
This has prompted criticism from the general public, as a retreat from earlier promises of greater openness, better regulation and an end to sleazy financial practices – the legacy of the 1990s.
It is believed that she has done her job perfectly too well and fairly and some people in senior positions clearly don’t like the result of her work. This sends a very dispiriting signal about Parliament’s willingness to police itself thoroughly[6].
In his book, British businessman George Moody Stuart writes from his first hand experience of corruption that development based on corruption practices has driving forces with particular characteristics such as
A focus
towards large-scale capital-intensive investment and away from those, which
maximize use of local labour and resources.
Inadequate attention to long term affordability and maintenance;
inadequate care for protecting the environment and decisions taken recently,
outside normal government procedures and with little or no consultation.[7]
The damage corruption causes is not only economic. It also undermines social values and can imperil democracy itself.
THE
STATE, POLITICS AND REFORMS IN TANZANIA: A BACK GROUND
In
her discussion on “the state in Tanzania”, Hartmann contends that social and
political developments in Tanzania co-existed and overlapped in many ways. During Nyerere’s era (1961 – 1985) the government
was scarred by severe economic crisis.
From 1978 onwards Tanzania began to experience economic imbalances which
reached alarming proportions in 1980s and punctured the social development that
had been achieved in the first half decade (1961 – 1978). The economic policies failed to generate
growth or development and ensuing economic crisis eroded the purchasing powers
of most social groups, creating immense social and economic insecurities and
the real wages fell by 65 per cent from 1974 to 1988. (Hartman, 1994).
Hartman states further that the change in the economic conditions of 1985 also coincided with charges of leadership. A new government led by President Mwinyi came to power in 1985 and a major reordering of the state apparatus occurred.
The separation of the party from the government took place, Nyerere became the party chairman and president Mwinyi became the Leader of the government. This new arrangement introduced a new political discourse and new political arrangement (ibid).
Different processes and new political alignments came about. The liberalized policies conflicted with the strong command economy based on Ujamaa ideology of the ruling party, Chama cha Mapinduzi, CCM. The separation of party leadership from government leadership resulted into different philophies of development, which in turn created competing political groups which culminated into political pluralism in the country.
It is important to note Nyerere’s immense contribution to Tanzania’s statehood today and stability and peace that is enjoyed by its citizens. It is important to recognize the fragility of the African states after colonialism, because they lacked social and political cohesion. Nyerere had to create the state, consolidate it and institutionalize it so that it would give him the tool to develop a political community with a common political culture within a new state formation (Tordoff 1967, Pratt 1976, Hartmann 1994).
Hartmann describes a patron-client relationship that had existed between Nyerere and his appointees which ensured that Nyerere’s policies and his ideas were accepted and would become projected at all levels of administration and in the society (ibid). Nyerere gave greater value to the principle of loyalty than to any other principle. Those leaders who observed careful this principle, found themselves returned into leadership positions irrespective of their incompetence (ibid).
Politics is defined as the exercise of power; it is a competition for access and control over resources. It is the competition among individuals and groups pursuing their interests. It is the determination of who gets what, when and how (James N. Danziger 1994) This competition becomes even more acute when the resources are scarce and control becomes even more vital.
Competing for political career becomes a survival issue. Hartmann describes the situation well that:
The
government’s liberal policies and the party’s socialist rhetoric
Have created
a disjuncture from the old political economy and the new emergent one. It seems as if there are almost two
political systems, which are juxtaposed against each other, creating
contradictory processes and ambivalence in the political economy of the country. The corporatist political structures
co-exist side with capitalist practices.
The huge state sector co-exists with the parallel market. The ideology of socialism in becoming more
ideology and removed from actual realities of life8.
In
response to the kind of Hartmann’s analysis, the third phase government of
Tanzania led by President Benjamin William Mkapa has come up with four major
policy planning initiatives. The first
initiative is Vision 2025 which is Government of Tanzania document that broadly
outlines Tanzania’s aspirations for the future. The document envisages wide-ranging institutional reforms which
aim at unleashing the power of the market and the private sector and democracy
striking a balance between the state and other institutions and promoting
democracy and popular participation.
A
second long-term vision is the National Poverty Eradication Strategy (NPES)
published in 1997, which addresses poverty eradication up to the year 2010.
Together with NPES, a third initiative is the Tanzania Assistance Strategy (TAS) outlines the medium – term role of the international donor community in facilitating and financing the concretization of vision 20259.
Finally, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PSRP) formulated in the context of HIPC, is a medium term (3 years) strategy of poverty reduction consonant with NPES. These policies are initiated in conjunction with IMF and World Bank Programmes to secure macroeconomic stability and economic efficiency, namely the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PGRF), as well as the Programmatic Structural Adjustment credit (PSAC-1) one such reform is the privatization process, currently overseen by the Presidential Parastatal Reform Commission (PPRC). The initiatives also depend upon sector–specific strategies developed by other donors. A good example is the PSRP which is closely linked to the local Government Reform Programme (LGRP).
Different programmes of reforms associated with different donors, has generated what Therkilsden terms a syndrome of “reformitis” in which lack of coordination, duplication and excessive reporting requirements act themselves as an obstacle to improving services (Therkilsden 2000:64).
Tanzania public service typically produces 2400 quarterly reports a year for external donors, and is visited by 1000 donor missions. The government is vigorously streamlining the reform processes partly in response to these events (Tim Kelsall 2002).
Democracy
can help limit corruption if it gives people alternative avenues of complaint
and gives incumbents an incentive to be honest.
Corruption scandals are frequently associated with the financing of political campaigns. Elections must be financed. Financial pressures give politicians an incentive to accept payoffs thus defeating the purpose of competitive elections in mult-party democracy.
The problem that has emerged in modern political parties is that they have lost ideological focus and instead, are dominated by “business – politicians”.10
Our political system must find a way to finance political campaigns without encouraging the sale of politicians to the electorate. The government has to draw a clear line between “takrima” or hospitality and bribery; otherwise elections will continue to be based on quid pro quo deals by some politicians as witnessed in the past elections, particularly parliamentary elections.
The other problems of corruption during election is that though there are some incidences of outright purchase of votes or favours but are muted and difficult to document for evidential purposes because are done in secrecy.
During fund raising, which seem permissive, some politicians and their wealthy patrons may prefer the anonymity of an illegal gift. Keeping the gift secret, Susan Rose-Ackerman argues that,
Can help hide
the illicit quid pro quo and will facilitate efforts to siphon off funds for
personal use. Voters cannot be expected
to look with tolerance on tax breaks or contracts granted in return for
payoffs.11
For
some of political elites, they have developed a neat network where funds are
managed by local elites and some of whom are retrenches through the ongoing
government reforms in which one of its important features is downsizing the
civil service workforce into an efficient, professional and manageable entity.
There is an increased demand for secondary school education which has to be satisfied by means of local, tribal trust funds, which provide money for, inter alia, the building of schools (Kelsall 2002). District councils are also expanding their education provision, partly through harambee efforts (ibid).
National elites maintain ties with local districts for patriotic, familial or sentimental reasons, and because some of the richest resources – minerals, cash, crops, fisheries, tourism-are to be found there. In consequence, national elites patronize local trust funds as well as other type of NGO’s to secure local support and national recognition and support in election competitions (ibid).
Local elites educate their children through the funds, build prestige in them and sometimes embezzle the very funds that are intended for the larger community. Local and national elites are intertwined and are more closely connected by a skein of reciprocities, the ideology to which is localism (ibid).
This type of clientelism, based on gaining office in a competitive election, acts as an incentive to corruption. It is a common practice for a considerable period of time now, the buying of drinks and food, giving of gifts and money, has played a part in election campaigns, particularly in 1995 and 2000 General elections.
Allegations
based on corruption were many that led to many election petitions and I will
examine among others, two cases only, that reached the court of appeal, the
highest court of the land.
The first case is that of JOSEPH WARIOBA v STEPHEN WASSIRA AND ANOTHER 12 Kisanga, J.A writing on behalf of his brethren Justice of the Court of Appeal. The contentious ground of appeal in that case was that “the learned trial judge erred in law when, having correctly found the Respondent to have committed corrupt practices, he declined to certify to the Director of Elections that the Respondent is guilty of corrupt practices”.
The trial judge (Lugakingira, J) declined to certify to the Director of Elections because corrupt practices was not made the subject for certification in accordance to s.114 (1) of the Elections Act of which states:
Where
the court determines that a person if guilty of any illegal practice, it shall
certify the same to the Director of elections.
The
court was confronted with two submissions on this point. The first submission was of the view that
corrupt practice was made an electoral offence under the Elections Act no. 1 of
1985 and that upon the court findings that there was corrupt practices
committed by an election contestant or candidate, by virtue of provisions of
s.114 (1) supra, the high court which had jurisdiction to hear election
petitions then was required to report or certify to the Director of Elections
any findings of corrupt or illegal practices.
And that in 1990, however, the law was amended by Act no.13 of 1990
whereby the offences of corrupt practices were removed from the election Act
and that by Act no.20 of 1990 the offences of corrupt practices were
transferred to the Prevention of Corruption Act no.16 of 1971.
Thus Ss. 94, 96, 97, 98, 100, 102(1) and 107 of the Election Act restores corruption practices but omission was done in restoration of corrupt practices in s.114 of the Election Act; and that such omission was an oversight or inadvertence.
The other submission was that the re-introduction of those sections (Ss. 94, 96, 97, 98, 100, 102(1) and 107 to the Act envisaged that the proceedings relating to those offences will be of a criminal nature in which the charge is laid; the Director of Public Prosecutions appears and, if the charge is proved, conviction is entered. The nature of the proceedings envisaged by s.114 (1), however, is different. That provision envisaged proceedings where no charge has been laid, the Director of Public Prosecutions does not appear and, if the offence is proved, the court does not convict, but merely determine that the person concerned is guilty of illegal practices. And that the omission to restore corrupt practices in s.114(1) was deliberate in as much as the proceedings envisaged by that section are not of a criminal nature; they are those which end up not with a conviction but with a mere determination of guilty.
The Court rejected the second views on the basis that there is no consistency as one would have expected that if both corrupt and illegal practices are confirmed within the ambit of Ss 94, 96, 97, 98, 100, 102(1) and 107 and that the offence of illegal practice would be deleted from s.114 and the omission to do so cannot be said was through inadvertence. The court reasoned that it is conceivable that there will be instances of alleged illegal practices in which the Director of Public Prosecutions does not consider it fit to institute criminal proceedings. In that case the elections court has to deal with allegations to see whether or not they are proved. The Parliament must have deliberately retained the reference to illegal practices in s.114 in order to cater for such situations that empower the court to deal with persons found guilty of illegal practices.
Likewise in instances of alleged corrupt practices in which the Director of Public Prosecutions does not consider it fit to mount prosecution, in which case the election court has to deal with the matter, the court held that the omission to re-introduce corrupt practice in s.114 was through inadvertence, especially so, as the objects and reasons for the relevant Bill (Election Act) make it abundantly clear that the intention was to bring back the offences of corrupt practices to the election Act.
The Court of Appeal reading in the words “corrupt practices” in s.114(1) even though were not there to fulfill its judicial function to that satisfied the aim or intention of the Legislature which was to bring back the Elections Act to the status which it was in, prior to the 1990 amendment to it.
The Court of Appeal was persuaded by the reasoning found in KAMMIS BALLROOMS CO. LTD v ZENITH INVESTMENTS (Torquay) Ltd (3) at 893 Diplock, L. on behalf of the Lords of the House of the Lords, adopted the “purposive approach” instead of the literal approach, and imputed to Parliament an intention not to impose a prohibition inconsistent with the objects which the statute was designed to achieve, though the draftsman had omitted to incorporate in express words any reference to that intention.
The same views were echoed in NOTHMAN v BARNET LONDON BOROUGH (4) at 1246, Lord Denning, M R said:
The literal
method (of construction) is now completely out of date. It has been replaced by ………… the “purposive”
approach….. in all cases now in interpretation of statute we adopt such a
construction as will promote the general legislative purpose underlying the
provision….13
Kisanga, J. A. reasoned further that such construction is justified in order to remove the discriminatory effect of s.114 which would arise from the literal construction of that provision. Discrimination is offensive to the provisions of Article 13(2) of constitution of the United Republic which in effect prohibits the enactment of any law that is either discriminatory or is discriminatory in its effects.
The effects of the court’s holding an election candidate guilty of corrupt practice or illegal practices as stated by Kisanga, J A. is that
The consequences
that follow would include deleting from the register of voters the name of the
person so certified, and the disqualification of that person for a period of
five years from registering as a voter or from voting.14.
The
court concluded that it was justified to read the word “corrupt or” into s.114
and that it was not necessary or desirable for that matter to wait for
Parliament to amend the law. The
Respondent was found guilty of corrupt practice, and the Court of Appeal varied
the trial judge’s failure to verify the same to the Director of Elections.
The second case is the Attorney-General and 2 others v AMAN WALID KABOUROU15 which was decided by the Court of Appeal as well and the judgment was written by the former Chief Justice, Francis Nyalali, on behalf of his brethrens.
The court in deciding the term “corruption practices” for the purpose of the Election Act had this to say:
The court in
deciding the term “corrupt practice” for the purpose of clarity we need to
point here that the removal of illegal practices and corrupt practices from
s.108 by the Elections (Amendment) Act 1992 (Act no.6 of 1992) as specific
grounds for nullification of election results cannot be construed as having the
effect of making illegal practices or corrupt practices permissible under the
Election Act, 1985. what the amendment
achieved was to make illegal practices and corrupt practices per se no longer
sufficient grounds for nullification of election result under the circumstances
stipulated under s.108(3) (9) and (d) as it then was before the amendment .
…. In our
considered opinion, illegal and corrupt practices are still relevant either as
non-compliances or as electoral misconduct which renders election unfree or,
and unfair, contrary to the principles and objectives which underlie the
Constitution and the Elections Act16
The C. J. went further to state that:
In other
words not every non-compliance which affects the results of an election
necessarily makes an election unfree and unfair17
However, it was the finding of the Court that in casu, the maintenance work of the Kigoma – Ujiji road during the election campaign constituted non-compliance with the prohibition against electoral bribery, and was executed with the corrupt motive of influencing voters to vote for the CCM candidate and accordingly affected the results of the election. The Court further held that the political campaign by Mrema and Kiula (both MP’s) prior to the permissible campaigning period having begun was illegal and must have affected the results of the by-election 18
Another important area that has to be looked at very closely, is managing conflicts of interest. Potential conflict of interest exits whenever a politician or a member of his or her family or staff has an ownership interest in a firm that does business with the government or that can benefit from state policy. The leadership Code of Ethics Act requires them to report or declare their financial interest.19
The major function of the Commissioner for Ethics is to ensure that politicians and senior public officers provide information of any pecuniary interest or other material benefit which a politician or MP receives which might reasonably be thought by others to influence his or her actions, speeches or votes in Parliament or actions taken in his or her capacity as a member of Parliament.
The test for declaration of interests is not whether actions in Parliament will be influenced by the interest nor whether the interest provider intended to exercise influence, but whether others might reasonably think that this might be the case.
Standard of behaviour expected of the politicians and public servants in public life is to put public interest first than personal interest. When scrutinizing bills in parliament the public interest context must be borne in mind first.
In dealing with ethical dilemmas in public life, there is a dire need to ensuring that codes of values, ethics and conduct are put in place beginning with our schools’ curriculum and in all public institutions.
Values denote the individual principles or standards that guide judgments about what is good and proper. For example, political impartiality, honesty, fairness, objectivity etc.
Ethics connote moral standards, norms of human conduct, social behaviour in public service and translate those ideals or ethos into everyday practice. It is a set of principle that guides conduct.
Conduct
is the actual actions or omissions and behaviour of public officers. This is important for politicians and public
officials to ask and resolve these ethical dilemmas if political corruption is
to be kept at minimum.
· What kind of gift or entertainment should public servants or politicians accept from someone with whom they do business?
· Under what circumstances should the public servant or politician lie to the public?
· Under what circumstances is moonlighting acceptable?
· To what extent should politicians or public servants criticize government policies and programmes in public?
· To what extent should civil servant participate in partisan
Political activity?
In designing codes as said above, there are three options:
· Codes of general character applying to the entire public
service.
· Decentralized codes specific to individual departments,
ministries and agencies.
· Co-existence of codes at both public service and agency
levels.
The rationale for having codes of ethics and or conduct is:
· Statement of values, roles and duties.
· Clarify ethical behaviour expected.
· Provide ethical guidance for ethical conduct for ethical
conduct.
· Help to resolve potential ethical dilemmas.
· Clarify procedures and sanctions to deal with misconduct and
displinary role.
· Inspirational, guiding and regulating character.
There are two extremes of these codes: The ten commandment approach that has limited number of principles or values that are expressed in broad terms e.g. the UK Principles of public life. The other is the Justinian model that is extremely detailed and comprehensive in scope. e.g. Australian code contains 115 pages covering 20 different areas. Most codes lie between these two polar extremes.
THE
APPROACH IN DESIGNING CODES WILL DEPEND ON:
· The existence and capacity of ethics infrastructure.
· How widely values are shared or obeyed.
· The strength of administrative and legal traditions.
· The existence and strength of other forms of control e.g. PCB, Human Rights and Good Governance Commission, Parliament etc.
· The extent and pace of economic modernization e.g. New Pubic management which promises competitive providers of public services and ensure exit in case of default. Reduction of monopoly and unjustifiable discretion, contracting out public services etc.
More direct restrictions are needed if the system does not allow competition and where politicians rely too heavily on “sweeteners” to win elections and if voters are poorly informed. We note that politicians have leeway to favour large contributors, and the gifts themselves can be used to mislead voters as to the candidate’s competency and behaviour.
Disclosure of interests by politicians and making them public permits citizens to vote against corrupt politicians. It gives citizens an alternative choice to make.
Secondly, public accountability is necessary for the control of corruption. Limits on the power of politicians and political institutions combined with independent monitoring and enforcement can be potent anti-corruption strategies. Limits include the separation of powers between the Legislature, Executive and Judicial branches of government.
Increased openness and accountability of the agent - the government to its principal, the citizens, will have an impact on minimizing corruption. Free flow of information of what the government is doing to the general public is extremely necessary. The role of independent media to inform the public on what the government is doing is equally important. The civil society and private sector citizen’s groups will play an important role as partners in curbing corruption in the country. An independent Audit authority is another important pillar for accountability. Complaint mechanism that redresses public complaints is unlikely if people fear reprisals. There must be a guarantee for whistleblowers and witnesses to be protected through an elaborate legal framework.
Corruption can be curbed by limiting on political power. Controls must make corruption less profitable for both politicians and public officials and bribe payers. The legal framework to combat corruption must ensure that in no uncertain terms that corruption does not pay and is intolerable. Enforcement mechanisms must demonstrate its deterrent effect.
Public education and openness, leaves public officials and politicians vulnerable to popular discontent. Self interest and the public interest frequently conflict. Public office holders are elected, appointed or employed to serve public interests. Public office is public trust and if self-interest is left unchecked, will threaten public interests through nepotism, financial interests and the like. Corruption can be minimized only if there is a strong political will and coalition building of all stakeholders to combat it.
1. Beckmann Bjorn (1988), The Post-colonial State: Crisis and Reconstruction’ in IDS Bulletin, Sussex, Vol.19, No.4
2. George Moody Stuart, How Business Bribes Damage Developing Countries, Oxford University Press, 1977.
3. Jeannette Hartmann, The state in Tanzania: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow’ in African Perspectives on Development, Controversies, Dilemmas and openings, edited by ulf Himmelstrand, Kabiru Kinyanju and Edward Mburugu, Villiers publications, London, 1994.
4. Pratt R.C. (1976) The Critical Phase in Tanzania, 1945-68, Nyerere and emergency of a socialist strategy, Cambridge University Press.
5. Susan Rose – Ackernan, Corruption and Government, Causes, Consequences and Reform, Cambridge University Press, 1999.
6. Tim Kelsall, “Shop Windows and Smoke –Filled Rooms: Governance and Politicization of Tanzania 2002, (unpublished).
7. Tordoff, William (1967), Government and Politics in Tanzania, Nairobi: East African Publishing House.
8. Therkilsden, O. (2000) ‘Public, Sector Reform in a Poor Aid – Dependent Country, Tanzania in Public Administration and Development 20:61-71.
[1] Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences and Reform, Cambridge University Press, 1999, PP.9-10
[2] Ibid
[3] BBC NEWS, Wednesday 22 November, 2000; 11:08 GMT
[4] Guardian Unlimited, an article by David Pallister, Guardian, Friday January 26, 2001
[5] Guardian Unlimited an article by David Henckle, Westminster Correspondent, Guardian, Thursday October 25, 2001
[6] Guardian Unlimited, an article by Michael White, Political Editor, Guardian, Friday October 19, 2001.
[7] George Moody Stuart, Grand Corruption: How Business Bribes Damage Developing Countries, Oxford, 1977.
8 Jeannette Hartmann, The state in Tanzania in African perspectives on Development, Edited by, Ulf Himmelstrand Kinyanjui and Mburugu, Villiers publications, London, 1994
9 Tim Kelsall , “Shop Windows and Smoke-filled Reforms: Governance and the Re-Politicization of Tanzania”, 2002 (unpublished)
10 Susan Rose-Ackerman, Op.cit,p.133
11 ibid, pp.134-135
12 (1997) TLR 272
13 ibid
14 ibid, see also s.96 of Election Act no. 13 of 1985
15 (1996)TLR 156
16 ibid
17 ibid
18 ibid
19 Act no.13 of 1995 as amended; it include assets and liabilities