Danielle Dupont

Historical Reasons for the Decline of Mass Transit

1. The Dismantling of Mass Transit Systems in the United States

Between 1910 and 1930 the separate policies adopted to cover private automotive and mass transit development in American cities had a profound effect on the rise of the first and a decline of the latter. Mass transit was a publicly regulated private business attempting to operate without public funds or community input; while an automotive friendly infrastructure with public funds and community support became an unchallenged public responsibility. This odd mix of public support for personal transport and privately operated publicly regulated mass transit resulted in a fragmented approach to urban transportation (Barrett, p. 3), in which mass transit was unable to thrive.

It is of little surprise that competing privately owned transit franchises were often more interested in turning a profit than serving the community that depended on them. Transit providers often used their rail lines to promote their private real estate ventures and refused to build connections to competing rail lines or to other growing communities. They had a wide reputation for corruption, using bribery, political pressure, and economic favors to win the favors of politicians, subsequently losing the trust of their ridership. When transit in-fighting began to infringe on their viability and profits, they turned to the community for advice and subsidy. At that time the public was accustomed to mass transit paying its own way, and politicians didn't want to visibly associate themselves with the seedy reputation of transit. Politically, road development was far less sticky. Between 1919 and 1929, America's growing infatuation with the automobile and willingness of drivers to pay a 3-4 cents a gallon encouraged government officials to look to road enhancement (Gordon p. 10).

It was this auto friendly environment that allowed General Motors to involve itself in rail and bus production, actively shifting passengers from rail to buses, and then allowing those bus lines to atrophy, and finally dismantling numerous electric transit systems. In 1949, a federal court found General Motors guilty of criminal conspiracy, fining the company $5,000 and its treasurer $1. General Motors continued its operations for 6 more years and by 1955 only 5,000 street cars remained (of 40,000 in 1936) and 88% of the nations street car network was eliminated (Stren p. 182).

Through interlocking personnel and subsidiary relationships, there were many participants in this conspiracy: National City Lines, American City Lines, Pacific City Lines, Standard Oil of California, Phillips Petroleum, Omnibus Corporation, Yellow Coach, Rex Finance Corporation, United Cities Motor Transit, Mack Truck, Firestone, Hertz Corporation, Greyhound, and numerous others (Clair p. 56).

For a well documented and elaborately researched account of the names, dates, and players of this historically pivotal assault on public transportation I would suggest David J. St. Clair's book The Motorization of American Cities. From his detailed account I will pull only a few fascinating details. When General Motors' subsidiary company National City Lines was in the process of turning the established rail system into the universally unpopular bus service, an internal report labeled "Completely Confidential" (1957) showed that "the electric streetcars and electric trolley coaches that NCL continued to operate after acquisition were generally their biggest net revenue producers. The figures hardly support a program of rapid and complete bus substitution." (St. Clair p. 72) Another example of the suspicious desires to shut down profitable electric options can be found in 1937 Pasadena where the rail lines generated $25,207 net operating income (with a per mile cost of $16.02) in contrast to a loss a $97,594 (with a per mile vehicle cost of $20.78) for the busses. These statistics hardly support the dismantling of the transit system.

When the transit systems where sold by NCL after motorization, any return to electric vehicles was explicitly prohibited through contract provisions that prevented the new buyers from engaging in the purchase of any new equipment using any fuel or means of propulsion other than gas (St. Clair p. 64). This resulted in a complete stagnation of competition. Closer to home, the FBI reported that the city of St. Petersburg, Fl. had passed a resolution changing to buses it was rumored that these councilmen and the city manager received gifts to influence this decision(and) that transition (was) undertaken without regard to the financial condition of the city, in spite of the fact that street cars provided adequate facilities and were financially remunerative. (FBI Field Report, Miami, Florida, October 31, 1947, 60-145, NCL Investigation, FBI Files)

2. The History of Mass Transit in Tampa

Here in Tampa our history followed the same pattern as in the north. Lack of public regulation of privately owned trolley lines caused the Tampa Electric Light and Power Company (TECO) to wage a "transportation war" that bankrupted the Tampa Street Railway in 1894. The Tampa Street Railway was in the hands of TECO by 1894 and its trolley lines had 21 ½ miles of track. In 1907, TECO purchased the Tampa & Sulphur Springs Traction Company and added their trolley holdings together operating 47 miles of track and 67 trolley cars. Statistics from TECO Archives record that between 1914 and 1929 total passengers carried rose from 12,061,397 to 18,394,524 even though automobile registration rose from 1,538 to 38,643. By 1946 55.91 miles of track and 168 trolley cars serviced the Hillsboro region with main lines extended to West Tampa, Ballast Point and Ybor City. Two branch lines ran out of Ybor City, one to the dam and the other to Desoto Park "where picnics grounds, an excellent beach, and a fishing dock awaited riders" (Grismer p. 309). The system was abandoned by TECO on August 1, 1946.

Afterwards, bus transportation was provided by the Tampa Transit Lines, which is a subsidiary of the National City Lines of Chicago. According to the Federal Court records regarding General Motors in the National City Lines anti-trust cases in 1955, General Motors' general council Henry Hogan stated that they successfully motorized the city and liquidated its investment because it was "decided that the only way this new market for city buses could be created was for it to finance the conversion form streetcars to buses in some small cities." (St. Clair p. 58) The national effect of General Motors and its allies had another dire consequence for public transport: its preferential agreements based on the goals of supporting "buddy-businesses" has caused transportation technology to be vastly underdeveloped and non competitive. General Motors buses do not have the technology of European buses. European models have a greater fuel efficiency, more passenger space & comforts, newer suspension systems, and all ten years before General Motor's RTS-11 "new" bus design that is actually less fuel efficient, has higher maintenance and operation costs, and costs 50% more than its previous design (Yago p. 206).

It is ironic that rail technology, which was developed here in America by Richard Spague, has not simply failed to be competitive, but has virtually disappeared. When San Francisco was developing its new street car system, one city official noted "there are not enough qualified engineers who work on this anymore". The signal and car-carried controlled system for the new project had to be imported from Sweden and West Germany. Because of lack of underground construction technology, a mile of United States tunneling costs the taxpayer 140-160 million dollars, compared to 6 million a mile in England. The reasons for the immense cost differences cited by our Department of Transportation are "lack of technological innovation, trained labor, and efficient management and labor practices" (Yago p. 207).

Unlike the integrated planning strategies of Europe, each local government unit was able to specify options for rail supplies. The resulting lack of standardization added to the price tag and prohibited the future integration of rail systems. A standing example of this it that Baltimore and Washington's rail cars are not compatible with each other's tracks or tunnels (Yago, p. 203). In our neighborhood, it should be noted that Hillsborough and Pinellas counties are currently developing mass transit plans that will be impossible to integrate. This lack of coordination will be expensive to remedy and will be a great impediment to successful local transit (Ed Crawford, Alliance for Mass Transit & Livable Communities).

3. Mass Transit, Lobbyists, and Subsidies

Another historical force in the decline of mass transit is in the use subsidies. In the first decades of this century both transit and the infrastructure to accommodate private vehicles required extensive public assistance, but only motor vehicles received it (Gordon, p. 11).

In America, how does one receive subsidies? Answer: the lobbyist. In 1902 AAA formed with the knowledge that "for many years an organization will be necessary to defend the automobile from unjust and oppressive legislation resulting from prejudices of the public during its introductory period" (Schneider, p. 33).

In 1914 the National Automobile Chamber of Commerce (NACC) became and remained the auto industries primary trade association and is currently the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association. A subsidiary of the MVMA safety division, organized in 1937 is the Automobile Safety Foundation (ASF). It was still mostly financed by its parent organization and its officers were auto-industry personnel, however, its name sounded non-political and impartial, just perfect for lobbying. While the ASF did not participate in the congressional hearing on automobile safety in the 60's, it did lobby extensively for additional sources of revenue for highway needs. A timeline of California's highway transportation budget in which ASF was called on to prepare the Highway Needs Report is illustrative:

1944 $18 million annual budget
1946 $42 million
1948 $98 million
1952 $250 million
1967 $1 billion
1968 It opposed the 1968 Los Angeles rapid transit proposal

Though there are many lobbyist organizations, I will only cover one additional automotive lobbying group. The National Highway Users Conference (NHUC), formed in 1932 by Alfred P. Sloan Jr. of General Motors had been, among other things a staunch and successful supporter of highway use fees, the taxes raised by gasoline, car and driver's license registration, etc., and lobbied successfully in 1956 Highway Trust Fund that these fees would be used solely for road building. Fortune magazine reported in 1955 that the auto interests "like to blame the highway mess of diversion of some $200-$300 million a yearaway from road use. However they gloss over the fact that 4 to 5 times as much money is diverted to road use from general revenues and property taxes" (Schneider, p. 93).

4. Mass Transit, Automobiles, and Urban Sprawl

The natural consequence of a national transportation system that fosters highway building above all other investments is urban sprawl. I won't go into the vast environmental social and economic consequences of this vital land use issue, as my focus is on how urban sprawl directly reduces the viability of mass transit. The money spent in road building makes residential and business centers further and further apart, with no apparent end in sight. Mass transit works best in denser communities. In order to accommodate this unprecedented human lifestyle of distance and isolation, cars become a necessity not an option. People view their cars as symbols of freedom and more roads must be built for even denser traffic in the mad rush to get to the store, school, work, or home, that once used to be walking or transit distance. Walking and bicycling, both helpful in accessing transit stations, even when those transit stations are comfortable accessible, become dangerous. According to a 1997 study Florida drivers are first place for having the greatest pedestrian fatalities in the nation (Jacque Bishop, p. 1). Hillsborough, explains Ron Sheck, "was built in the Big Box mode: stand-alone builidings at the center of vast parking lots, surrounded by more of the same. Chickens in Tampa, don't even try to cross the road"(Jacque Bishop, p. 1). It is unfortunate that walking to the bus stop may be considered a life or death venture, and that we have built vast parking seas, rather than park and ride garages attached conveniently to transit lines. It is these choices our society has made that negatively impacts mass transit, and forces people to buy more cars which will eventually need more roads to handle the demand. The only reality check here is that building more highways is an addictive unreality. A freeway lane may serve 1,500 cars in a peak hour (though commuters are unlikely to exceed 2,500) a street car could carry 5 times the people, and express subway train 60,000 passengers per hour per track, equivalent to 24 lanes of freeway. "Americans spent 1.8 billion for local public transport in both 1941 and 1963, while motorcar expenditures nearly tripled rising from 13.2 to 38.3 billion (Schneider, p. 67). Building more roads will never lead to enough roads. Highway 41 is a local road that was built with FDOT funds and illustrates many of the concerns previously addressed. Residents quoted in the St. Petersburg Times note that "the six lane, high-speed roadway cannot easily be crossed by pedestrians, and with such a development the neighborhoods change". It was also reported that transportation corridors (like Hwy 41) encourage people to drive cars, reducing the demand for more sensible public transportation. This policy severely hurts the environment. Another concern common to highway development is if local residents have enough, if any input. In this case residents wanted their road only widened to four lanes and though planners admitted U.S. 41 needed only 4 lanes, DOT proceeded with the six-lane plan. The community, in public support of modest mass transit goals, requested that the 2 extra lanes be used for bike path and pedestrian walkways and enhanced bus shelters be built. Critics say nothing ever came of this study (Bayles, p. 1).

The good news hidden in the above example is that Americans are at least concerned and considering pavement alternatives. A recent article in the Pittsburgh Post Gazette chastised President Clinton's $3,000 tax deduction for the purchase of fuel efficient cars as not radical enough and suggested a tax credit to those who take public transit or car pool. The article also noticed the connection between the tax break and its benefits to the auto industry (Lifestyle, p. B-1).

In 1991 Congress began to shift away from the traditional "one size fits all" approach of paving new roads to an intermodal systems that contains environmental goals, provides more reliable and affordable choices, requires accountability from public decision makers, and gives local government and the public a part of the decision making process. These are the aspirations of the1991 federal transit law known as ISTEA. It is right now up for renewal and therefore a vulnerable position for lobbyists and politicians.

The road building lobby led by the Highway Users Federation is lobbying Congress to strip power from local governments, make public involvement optional and get back to their lucrative business of building new highways without accountability to tax payers.

As if an echo of the past, William Fay, president and CEO of the American Highway Users Alliance asserted in front of Congress that American motorists were being "ripped off" because a portion of gas tax funds are used on non-highway purposes. Dittmar, executive director of Surface Transportation Policy Prospect countered, arguing that highways were being subsidized and urging the committee to protect ISTEA's current performance based programs.

Another highway funds vs. rail funds battle is being waged in Pasadena. Green Scissors, an organization that proposes the cutting of wasteful and environmentally harmful public spending. The highway in question is State Route 710 which was originally planned in 1949 but halted in 1973 by a federal court injunction pending an adequate environmental impact statement. This proposed freeway would cost 1.4 billion and traverse historic neighborhoods, relocate 4,000 people, and destroy 7,000 mature trees. Green Scissors calls the freeway twice redundant, noting that the L.A. Metropolitan Transportation Authority is currently constructing a $804 mile light rail project that would serve the same commuter needs as the freeway for travel from Pasadena and Los Angeles to Long Beach. Also the nationally important $2.2 billion Alameda Corridor, which would serve freight movement from the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach parallels the route of the freeway (Green Scissors on the Web).

Finally and perhaps most importantly the success or failure of mass transit depends of our overall cultural values. Do we build communities of highways to nowhere? Do we assess the qualitative costs of highways vs. mass transit or just the quantitative? What is the cost of quality of life issues such as the transportation possibility of poor to more from welfare to work, or the maintaining the integrity of nature through the reduction of urban sprawl? Consider differences between Ybor City, a pedestrian friendly environment still similar in layout to its trolley past, and the strip mall chaos of Dale Mabry.

In not choosing, we still make a choice-most developers won't plan for traffic; private business will maximize their own profits without regard to public costs such as air pollution, traffic jams, or unsafe pedestrian crossings. "Business should be free to do what they do well, make money. But government officials also have to do what they are supposed to do, protect the interests of the public"(Cox News Service, financial pages).

Recently a ½ cent sales tax to fund Phoenix's mass transit was defeated in autumn of 97. The bulk of the comments made by the people calling Transit-Headquarters were of an anti-government nature. "The city can't run the bus system we have now. I can't see pouring good money after bad". When it was explained that more buses meant more routes and better service the response was "Oh, so you want to reward incompetence, do you?" Then there were the conspiracy buffs who viewed the transit package some form of government ploy to build a light rail system. Informed by anti-government radio talk show hosts, these people are devotees of the belief that light rail is evil. Surely rail is subsidized by taxpayers (Nilson Editorial, p. 136), but then again the U.S. spends over $300 billion per year to subsidize roads and cars (Getting There, Vol 12 #2 First Quarter 1998). The rail system in St. Louis was such a success that a planned freeway has been cancelled (Nilson Editorial, p. 136).

Here in Florida light rail may be in jeopardy because of a change Tom Feeney, a state legislator, wants to add to next year's budget. He proposes that if any local legislators raised any concern, that the entire cabinet would be called in to decide the issue rather than the governor being able to give the go ahead. The money for this light rail project is already in the budget and rail supporters say that the delay could cost $275 million in Federal Support. They argue that if a layer of bureaucracy is added to the project, and slows it, more committed projects in other states may get Congress' limited financial support (Pedicini, Orlando Sentinal Section A, Page A1).

References and Further Reading

Barrett, Paul. The Automobile & Urban Transport. (Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1983) p. 140.

Bayles, Tom. "A Widening Debate." St. Petersburg Times. (St. Petersburg, Times Publishing Company, 1996) December 20, 1996. Sec. North of Tampa p. 1.

Bishop, Jacque. "Stuck in Traffic." Tampa Tribune. (The Tribune Company, 1997) June 15, 1997. Sec. Commentary p. 1.

"Congress Debates ISTEA Administration's Proposal." Accessed 4-20-98. Available http://www.bikeplan.com/stpp228html

Cox News Service. "Public Officials Must Better Control Traffic in Growing Area." (Monday February 10, 1997) Financial Pages.

Crawford, Ed: Executive Director of Alliance for Modern Transit and Chairman of Hillsboro MPO Citizens Advisory Committee.

Gordon, Deborah. Steering a New Course: Transportation, Energy and the Environment. (Washington D.C., Island Press, 1991) pp. 7-27.

"Greenscissors 98: Cutting Wasteful and Environmentally Harmful Spending." Accessed: 4-20-98, available http://www.Foe.org/eco/scissors98/transportation.html#Demonstration

"Hearing of the Transporation Sub-Committee of the House Appropriations Committee." FY 97 Transportation Appropriations Chaired by: Rep. Frank Wolf. (Federal Information System Corporation: 2-28-1996)

Hebert, Richard. Highways to Nowhere. (NY, The Bobbs-Merrill Company Inc., 1972)

"How the 1997 Federal Transportation Law Can Increase Choice, Affordability, and Local Control." Accessed 4-20-98. Available http://www.transact.org/ch/iv4ch.html

Kay, Jane Holtz, Asphalt Nation. (NY, Crown Publishers, 1997) pp. 166, 167, 240, 241.

Nilsson, Joel. "Success of Anti-Transit Groups Gives Valley a Dim Future." The Arizona Republic. September 13, 1997. Sec. Editorial, p. B6.

O'Neil, Brian. "Credit Where Credits are Due." Pittsburgh Post Gazette. February 8, 1998. Lifestyle. B-1.

Redicini, Sandra. "A News Obstacle in Light Rails Path? Rep. Tom Feeney Wants Another Layer of Bureaucracy to Have a Say in the Project." Orlando Sentinel. (Sentinel Communications Company, 1998) April 11, 1998. Sec. A p. A1.

Schneider, Kenneth R.. Autokind vs. Mankind. (NY, W.W Norton & Company, 1971) pp. 25-95.

Sneller, Joe. "Good Government and Transit." Mass Transit. (Information Access Company, 1997) May 1997. No. 3, Vol. 23; pg 5; ISSN: 0364-3484

St. Clair, David J. The Motorization of America. (NY, Prager Publishers, 1986) pp. 56-156.

Stren, Richard, and White, Rodney, and Whitney, Joseph. Sustainable Cities. (Boulder, Westview Press, 1992) pp. 180-184.

"Study Recommends Rail Transit." Alliance for Modern Transit & Livable Communities, Inc. Getting There. First Quarter 1998, Vol. 2, Number 2.

TECO Archives: "Brief submitted by the TECO." (Tampa Fl., 1929) Submitted for the Anthony N. Brady Accident Achievement Award. Housed in USF special documents.

Yago, Glenn. The Decline of Transit. (NY, Cambridge University Press, 1984) pp. 56-76, 181-213.

Back to Mass Transit in Tampa Main Page