UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA     FALL 2003 

 

                                      IDH 2010: THE ACQUISITION OF KNOWLEDGE

 

                                                                 ESSAY TOPICS

 

                                                                    Kwasi Wiredu

 

 

This course is a course in epistemology or the theory of Knowledge. Since epistemology is a branch of philosophy, we need to have at least a preliminary acquaintance with the nature of philosophy.

 

                                                           The Nature of Philosophy

            A brief chapter on the general nature of Philosophy can be found in any introduction to Philosophy. There is also a good discussion of this subject in John Passmore "Philosophy" in Paul Edwards, ed., The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 6, pp.216-226. Read at least pp. 216 - 221. Anthony Quinton (A. Q.) has an elegant piece on what philosophy is in the Oxford Companion to Philosophy edited by Ted Honderich (pp. 666-670. See also the Appendix on "Maps of Philosophy" and "Chronological Table of Philosophy" (pp. 927-956.) You will love these sections.)

 

                                                         The Nature of Epistemology

Regarding the nature of epistemology, you may consult the following. (1) D. W. Hamlyn, "Epistemology, History of" in Paul Edwards' Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 3, pp. 9:1 -38:2. This is a long article good to read in whole, but if you are pressed for time, read pp. 9:1 - 10:1 on the general nature of epistemology, pp. 10:1 -- 12:1 on Plato's epistemology, pp. 16:1 - 18:1 on Descartes' epistemology and pp. 26:1-28:1 on Hume (but note also Reid's critique of Hume on p. 28:1). Hamlyn (D. W. H.) has a more compact discussion of the history of epistemology in his article in the Oxford Companion to Philosophy (pp. 243 - 245: "Epistemology, history of"). Complementary to this is the article "Epistemology, Problems of" in the same book written by Jonathan Dancy (J. D.), one of the most active contemporary epistemologists. Above all, read the entry on "Epistemology" by Gilbert Ryle (G. R.) in The Concise Encyclopedia of Philosophy edited by J. O. Urmson and Jonathan Ree (pp. 93-100).

 

(2) Avrum Stroll, "Epistemology" in The New Encyclopedia Britannica, Macropaedia, Vol 18, pp. 466 -  474: 1a. This is the first part of the article on epistemology. The second part is on "The History of Epistemology," and it is by A. P. Martinich. Read at least pp. 474:1a - 483:2a. 

 

 

                                                                      Instruction

 

            (1)        In the essays to be written in this course (two in number) you will usually be asked to summarize some prescribed texts. These summaries should always be in your own words. They should be strictly just compressed reports of what the author concerned says. Do not include any comment, explanation or illustration of your own. The time for that will come when, as you would inevitably be asked to do, you give your analysis and appraisal of the materials.

 

            (2)        Not only the summaries but also everything else in the essay should be in your own words, except that at the start you should quote the task description for the essay, word for word, exactly as given by me. You are at liberty to use ideas from any source, but put them in your own words and acknowledge.

 

            (3)        And let your words hang together in grammatically correct and lucid sentences and paragraphs.

 

            (4)        Also in connection with all the essays, you should always find AT LEAST two sources of your own, use them and cite them in your bibliography, differentiating them from the prescribed readings with asterisks. If you can consult more than two sources of your own, all the better.

 

            (5)        Each essay should be Two thousand words long (about eight pages, typed in double spacing).

  

 

 

                                             I. Knowledge, Infallibility and Skepticism

 

Plato, as we will see later, maintained that knowledge implies infallibility. If this view is combined with belief in universal human fallibility, skepticism would seem to follow. Plato, however, did not embrace skepticism because he had a certain very striking conception of the sources of knowledge and the conditions of its accessibility, which we will discuss in due course. On the other hand, many philosophers have believed that all human beings are fallible, and this has generated the following type of skeptical argument, which it would be useful to consider before coming to Plato's theory of knowledge.

 

                                                                DiscussionTopic:  

            It is self-contradictory to speak of knowing something that

            is false. Therefore what is known must be true. Hence knowledge

            implies infallibility. But all human beings are fallible. Therefore,

            it is not possible for human beings to know anything.

 

            Consider this argument critically. Be sure to examine each step closely. Are the inferential steps valid? Are there good reasons to accept the component statements? Take special account of Keith Lehrer's "Why Not Skepticism?" This article was originally published in The Philosophical Forum, Vol. II, No. 3, Spring 1971. It is reprinted in Harrison Hall and Norman Bowie, eds., The Tradition of Philosophy, (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1986). It is also reprinted in Louis P. Pojman, Introduction to Philosophy: Classical and Contemporary Readings, (Wadsworth, 1991). The article raises points that are relevant to the argument to be scrutinized.

            In connection with skepticism generally, read and take account of Bertrand Russell's "Appearance and Reality", excerpted in Harrison and Bowie, eds., op. cit. from Russell's The Problems of Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1912).

 

            As historical background to the problem of skepticism in general and to most of our concerns in this course, see the following:

(1) Richard H. Popkin, "Skepticism" in Paul Edwards, ed., The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (New York: Macmillan, 1967).

(2) Richard Popkin, "Skepticism" in The New Encyclopedia Britannica, 15th Edition. (Macropaedia, Vol. 25, pp. 590-- 593: a) This article is shorter than the previous one but covers basically the same ground. Before reading this you might like to read the compact summary in the Micropaedia.

(3) Discussions of skepticism occur also in the Britannica article on Epistemology at 473: 2a -- 474: 1a, 475: 2b-- 476: 2b and 482: 2b -- 483: 1b.

 

 

                                         II. Plato on the Acquisition of Knowledge and

                                                           Its Political Importance

 

                                                                Discussion Topic

            (a) How does Plato distinguish between knowledge and belief?

(b) And how, for Plato, is knowledge related to action, in particular, to the sort of action designed for the best governance of states?

            (c) How, according to Plato, may that knowledge be acquired?

            (d) Do you see any difficulties in Plato's views on these matters?

            Give reasons and explanations for your views.

 

            The following parts of Plato’s Republic (Translated by G. M. A. Grube, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1992) are especially relevant here: Bk. V, 471c – Bk. VII, 541b (pp. 146-212). In Cornford’s translation pp.175 – 263).

 

            In connection with this topic the following book will be found extremely useful:

Wallace I. Matson, A New History of Philosophy: Ancient and Medieval, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1987, chapters 11-14. (Chapter 10, which is on Socrates, will also be found interesting.)

 

            Two other books that will be found useful are the following.

T. Z. Levine, From Socrates to Sartre: The Philosophic Quest, New York: Bantam books, 1984, chaps. 1-5. Read also the brief introduction to the book entitled "Indestructible Questions", which is about philosophical questions.

            Samuel Enoch Stumpf, Philosophy: History and Problems, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1989, Book I, Chapter 3. You may want to read also chapter 2, which is about Socrates. The same material will be found in an earlier book by the same author (and publisher) entitled Socrates to Sartre. Watch and pray lest you confuse this book with that of Levine cited above. Note that the word "From" starts Levine's and is absent from Stumpf's.

 

            In regard to Plato's thought generally it would be good to read the article on Plato in Paul Edward's Encyclopedia of Philosophy written by the famous English philosopher Gilbert Ryle. In this article Ryle is not exactly orthodox, and you should read at least some of the references given above before reading his piece (of mind).

 

 

                                III. Descartes on the Foundations of Human Knowledge

 

                                                                Discussion Topic:

            (a) What, according to Descartes, are the foundations of human knowledge?

(b) Discuss Descartes' methodological skepticism and his way of solving it.

            (c) Take good note of the role of his proofs of the existence of God in that solution.

            (d) Is his reasoning circular at any point?

            Supply arguments and explanations for your contentions.

 

In this connection you need a close reading of Descartes' six meditations (in Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, Translated by Laurence Lafleur, New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1951).

 

            Descartes' thought typifies the philosophical thinking known as rationalism, while the philosophy of David Hume, whom we will be studying next after Descartes, typifies the contrasting philosophical standpoint known as empiricism. There is a very helpful general account of rationalism by Bernard Williams in Paul Edwards' Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The article is entitled "Rationalism". You should endeavor to read this article before or while reading Descartes' Meditations.

 

            On the specific topic described above you will find the following readings useful:

 

Bernard Williams, "Descartes" in Paul Edwards, ed. The Encyclopedia of Philosophy

T. Z. Levine, From Socrates to Sartre, Chapters 6-10, especially, 7, 8 and 9.

Samuel Enoch Stumpf, Philosophy: History and Problems, Chapter 12.

 

            The question whether the way Descartes uses his "proofs" of the existence of God to subdue skepticism involves a (vicious) circularity has evoked divergent answers. Two conflicting discussions are given in

Bernard Williams, "Descartes' Use of Skepticism" in Myles Burnyeat, ed., The Skeptical Tradition, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1983, pp. 347-350 and Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, New York: Image Books, 1985 [1960], Vol. IV, pp. 105-110.

 

 

 

                                    IV. Hume on the Foundations of Human Knowledge

 

                                                                Discussion Topic:

            (a) Read carefully Hume's "Skeptical Doubts Concerning the Operations of the Understanding" and his "Skeptical Solutions of these Doubts". (David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding edited by Charles W Hendel, New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1955, Sections IV and V. (The summaries should both add up to four pages.)

            (b) Evaluate at least one criticism of Hume's proposed solution.

            (c) What are your own views in regard to either Hume's doubts or his `skeptical' solution?

(d) In the course of your discussion critically compare Hume's treatment of skepticism with that of Descartes.

 

            In connection with (d) take special note of Section 1, pp. 22-25 of the Inquiry and also of Section XII: "Of the Academical or Skeptical Philosophy". In the same connection you will, of course, need to revisit your study of Descartes.

            Just as Descartes' epistemology typifies rationalism, Hume's typifies empiricism, as previously noted. Your attention was earlier called to Bernard Williams' article on Rationalism in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Paul Edwards. That article is matched in quality and usefulness by D. W. Hamlyn's article on Empiricism in the same encyclopedia. Here again, read this last mentioned article either before or while reading Hume.

            In Philosophy and An African Culture, London: Cambridge University Press, 1980. I have discussed Hume's doubts and his proposed solution and commented on a certain criticism of the solution. This discussion comes in the course of some comments on philosophical methods. Read pp. 165-170.

            There is an interesting discussion of Hume's theory of the foundations of human knowledge in Bertrand Russell's A History of Western Philosophy, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945) chapter XVII, especially pp. 664-674. Please, read it.

            If you did read Levine (From Socrates to Sartre) on Plato and on Descartes, you might want to read her discussion of Hume in Chapters 11-14.

            One of the principal problems raised by Hume in his discussion of the foundation of all reasonings from experience has been called the problem of induction, and various attempts have been made to solve or dissolve it. If you have the time, you might want to read Wesley Salmon's critical survey of some of the more famous of these attempts in his "Unfinished Business: The Problem of Induction." It was first published in Philosophical Studies, 33, 1978 and is reprinted in Argument and Analysis: An Introduction to Philosophy, edited by Martin Curd, New York: West Publishing Company, 1992. You might also consult his "An Encounter with Hume", a piece written specially for inclusion in the third edition of Joel Feinberg's anthology Reason and Responsibility: Readings in Some Basic Problems of Philosophy (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1985) and carried also in the seventh edition. In the first piece, which has the beginning student especially in mind, Salmon remarks (in footnote # 1) that the aim of the second article is to show how Hume's Inquiry "can speak effectively to contemporary students".

            A recent article arguing that induction can be inductively justified without vicious circularity is James Van Cleve's "Reliability, Justification and the Problem of Induction", originally published in P. French, T.Uehling, Jr. and H. Wettstein, eds., Midwest Studies in Philosophy, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984) and reprinted in Curd, op. cit. Again read this, if you have the time.

 

                                                                             

V. Thomas Kuhn on Science

 

Discussion Topic:

                                                                             

            (a) What does Kuhn mean by the following terms: (i) Paradigm (ii) Normal science (iii) Extraordinary science (iv) Scientific revolution?

            (b) Do you find any analogues of these concepts in any fields of thought outside of science? (If so are there any significant contrasts?)

            (c) Can one draw any normative lessons from the existence of such analogues, if any?

            (d) If you do not think that there are any such analogues, what, if any, would be the implications of that fact for the plausibility of Kuhn's account of the development of science?

            (e) What do you think are the strengths (if any) and the weaknesses (if any) of Kuhn's account of science?        

After Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996 [1970, 1962] read the following:

Margaret Masterman, "The Nature of a Paradigm", in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1970

K. R. Popper, "Normal Science and its Dangers", ibid.

            Note Kuhn's replies to these discussions of his theory in his "Reflections on my Critics" in the same book.

 

            One of the best known criticisms of Kuhn's book was the review of the first edition by Dudley Shapere entitled "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions". It was originally published in the Philosophical Review, 73, 1964 and is reprinted in Shapere's Reason and the Search for Knowledge (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1984). It is also included in Gary Gutting, ed., Paradigms and Revolutions: Appraisals and Applications of Thomas Kuhn's Philosophy of Science, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1980. After Kuhn recorded his reactions to the criticisms of the first edition of his book in the postscript to the second edition and gave vent to his "Reflections on my Critics" (including Shapere) in Lakatos and Musgrave, ibid., Shapere offered a critical evaluation of these additional efforts of Kuhn in his article "The Paradigm Concept" published originally on Science, Vol 172, 1971 and reprinted in Shapere's Reason and the Search for Knowledge.    

 

            Gutting's anthology, as its title suggests, is full of discussions relevant to questions (b) and (c) above. Explore as many of the articles as you have time for. A particularly interesting and useful one is Ian Barbour's "Paradigms in Science and Religion"

 

                                                                             

                                                          VI. Kuhn and Relativism

 

Discussion Topic:

 

            In the aftermath of Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions one of the most persistently raised issues has been that of relativism. The question of relativism is, in any case, of epistemological interest on its own account. Accordingly, let us consider the general question of relativism to start with.

 

            i.   What is Relativism?

            ii.  Note the distinction between cognitive and ethical relativism.

            iii. Do you agree with cognitive relativism? If so, explain why. In particular, show what you think is wrong with the arguments that anti-relativistic critics have given against relativism. On the other hand, if you disagree with cognitive relativism, show what you think is wrong with the arguments that proponents of that viewpoint have adduced in its favor.

 

There is a brief but very helpful discussion of relativism, moral and cognitive in the editors' introduction to the anthology called Relativism, Cognitive and Moral, edited by Michael Krausz and Jack W. Meiland (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1982, pp.1-9). Start with this. This book contains some first rate discussions of relativism. If you have the time, take a look at some of them. Nelson Goodman's exposition of what he takes to be a "radical relativism" in his "The Fabrication of Facts" is stylish, witty and challenging, though it might be found difficult in parts on account of philosophical allusions that might be unfamiliar. If so, you can trust the editors' introduction to Goodman's discussion to be of some help. On the anti-relativist side, Maurice Mandelbaum's "Subjective, Objective and Conceptual Relativisms" is also highly thought provoking. Richard B. Brandt has a short article on "Ethical Relativism" in Paul Edward's Encyclopedia of Philosophy, which is informative and philosophically enlightening. Read it by all means.

            In chapter 12 of Philosophy and An African Culture, which is cast in the form of a dialogue, I make criticisms of relativism. Read from pages 216 to 232, skipping any passage you find difficult. A more direct treatment of the issue is provided in my "Are there Cultural Universals?" in my Cultural Universals and Particulars. In this discussion, I try to show that, contrary to relativism, there can be, and there are, cultural universals of both the cognitive and moral kind.

 

            Project: (a) In what sense, if any, Kuhn might be called a relativist on account of his The Structure of Science. If you don't think that the attribution of relativism is correct, explain why it has seemed so to some readers.

            (b) What does Kuhn himself say in reaction to the attributions of relativism to him?

            (c) What do you think of his answer?

 

            Accusatory attributions of relativism to Kuhn are found in, for example, Popper's "Normal Science and its Dangers"(Lakatos and Musgrave, op. cit.) Moderately accusatory are the comments of Shapere in his "The Paradigm Concept" on how well Kuhn is able to deal with the question of relativism. Friendly attributions of relativism have also been made by, for example, Gerald Doppelt in his article "Kuhn's Epistemological Relativism: An Interpretation and a Defense" published in Inquiry, 21,1978 and included in the anthology on Relativism, Cognitive and Moral edited by Krausz and Meiland cited above.

 

Kuhn's own comments on the attributions of relativism to him may be found, in, for example, pp. 205-207 of his "Postscript" to the second edition of his The Structure of scientific Revolutions and in his reflections on his critics in Lakatos and Musgrave, op. cit., pp. 259-266.

            Another issue of considerable interest raised by Kuhn’s account of science is its implications for philosophy of science associated with logical positivism. We will take a brief look at this issue.  

 

 

THE SCHEME OF THINGS

 

I.          (1) Mon. Aug. 25:          Introductory

            (2) Wed. Aug. 27:         Epistemological Issues

 

II.                 (3) Mon. Sept. 1:           Labor Day Holiday       

(4) Wed. Sept. 3:           Skepticism

 

III.       (5) Mon. Sept. 8:           Skepticism

            (6) Wed. Sept. 10:         Plato

 

IV.       (7) Mon. Sept.15:          Plato                            

            (8) Wed. Sept.17:          Plato                            

 

V.        (9) Mon. Sept. 22:         Plato.                           

            (10) Wed. Sept. 24:       Descartes

 

IV        (11) Mon. Sept.29:         Descartes                     Essay #1 (Skepticism, Plato). Due today

            (12) Wed. Oct. 1:          Descartes 

 

V         (13) Mon. Oct. 5:          Descartes

            (14) Wed. Oct. 7:          Descartes and Hume: Rationalism and Empiricism

 

VI        (15) Mon.Oct.13:           Hume

            (16) Wed.Oct.15:          Hume

 

VII       (17) Mon. Oct.20:          MID-SEMESTER EXAM (On Rationalism, Empiricism)

            (18) Wed. Oct.22:         Hume

 

VIII      (19) Mon. Oct.27:          Hume                                      

            (20) Wed. Oct.29:         Hume and Induction

 

IX        (21) Mon. Nov. 3:          Hume and Induction

            (22) Wed. Nov. 5:         Kuhn

 

X          (23) Mon. Nov 10:         Veteran’s Day Holiday

            (24) Wed. Nov.12:         Kuhn

 

XI        (25) Mon. Nov.17:         Kuhn and Logical positivism      

            (26) Wed. Nov.19:         Kuhn and Logical positivism       Essay # 2 (Hume) Due today

 

XII       (27) Mon. Nov.24:         Kuhn and Relativism

            (28) Wed. Nov.26:         Kuhn and Relativism     

 

XIII      (29) Mon. Dec.1:           Review

            (30) Wed. Dec.3:          Review

 

FINAL EXAMINATION       Kuhn, Relativism, Logical Positivism &co.

 

 

 

GRADING

In addition to the two essays mentioned above, there will be a mid-term and a final exam. The essay assignments and the examinations will each account for 25% of the grading.  

 

 

 

OFFICE:                                 FAO 243

 

OFFICE HOURS:                  MW 1pm – 2pm       

 

OFFICE TELEPHONE:        974-5916

 

E-MAIL:                                 kwiredu@chuma1.cas.usf.edu

 

 

 

CLASS ATTENDANCE:

 

Attendance at classes is mandatory. If for some reason you are unable to attend a class, please, let me know the explanation as soon as practicable.