UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY

PHI 4784: ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY

&PHI 6934: ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY

FALL 2001

Kwasi Wiredu

OBJECTIVE

To study the origins and contemporary concerns of analytic philosophy.

ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY

All technical philosophy is analytical in part at least. “Analytical” means having to do with resolving complex concepts into their constituent elements and elucidating their internal relations among themselves and their external relations with adjoining concepts. The term “analytic philosophy,” however refers to a particular type of philosophy according to which analysis, understood in a sense to be investigated in this course, is the method of philosophy and conceptual clarification its mission. The origins of this philosophy can be traced to Moore and Russell and, through Russell to Frege. In the Anglo-American world the initial analytic impetus came from Moore’s “The Refutation of Idealism,” though Russell and Frege and eventually Wittgenstein later became more important internationally. Because Moore’s push toward analytic philosophy came as a reaction to idealism, it is important to know about idealism and the reaction to it in England and particularly in this country in various forms of realism. We will, however move fairly speedily over this area of investigation.

Pragmatism ran parallel to the realisms, and was critical of both idealism and realism. Although one of the founders of pragmatism, John Dewey, had passed through an idealist phase, pragmatism was not really a reaction to idealism. It had it own independent motivation. But because there was a lot of interaction between the pragmatists and the idealists and realists, it is useful to consider the former along with the latter. Recently pragmatism has been much in the (philosophical) news. Much of this is probably due to Rorty’s recent affirmations of pragmatism. But it must be remembered that Quine’s “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” was perceived to have a concluding pragmatic message. Pragmatism then has both a historical and contemporary interest for us.

BOOKS

(a) REQUIRED:

(1) James Baillie, Contemporary Analytic Philosophy, Prentice Hall, 1997.

(2) Milton K. Munitz, Contemporary Analytic Philosophy, New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1981

OTHER USEFUL BOOKS:

(1) E.D. Klemke, ed., Contemporary Analytic and Linguistic Philosophies, New York: Prometheus Books, 2^nd Edition, 2000.

(2) W. T Jones, A History of Western Philosophy: Vol. V: The Twentieth Century to Wittgenstein and Sartre, (New York: Harcourt Brace and Jovanovich, 1980).

(3) John Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy, (New York: Penguin Books, 2nd Edition, 1966).

(4) Larry Lee Blackman, Classics of Analytical Metaphysics, New York: University Press of America, 1984.

(5) Morris Weitz, 20th Century Philosophy: The Analytic Tradition, New York: The Free Press, 1966.

(6) Paul Moser and Dwayne Mulder, Contemporary Approaches to Philosophy, New York; Macmillan, 1994

(7) Robert R. Ammerman, Classics of Analytic Philosophy, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964

(8) Richard M. Rorty, ed., The Linguistic Turn, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992

TOPICS AND READINGS

PART I

I. IDEALISM AND THE REVOLT AGAINST IT

1. Josiah Royce, "Reality and Idealism" in E.D. Klemke, ed., Contemporary Analytic and Linguistic Philosophies, New York: Prometheus Books, 1983, chap. 1.

2. GE Moore, "The Refutation of Idealism," in Klemke, ibid.

3. W. T. Jones, A History of Western Philosophy, Valve, pp. 102-112.

4. A. J. Ayer, Philosophy in the Twentieth Century, New York: Vintage Books, "The Refutation of Idealism," pp. 55-59.

5. Paul Edwards, Encyclopedia of Philosophy on Idealism, (H. B. Acton), American Philosophy (Paul Kurtz).

6. Kwasi Wiredu, Philosophy and an African Culture, chap. 9, "To Be is to Be Known," (Pointing out an ambiguity in the principle of esse est percipi basic to all idealism)

Historical Background:

a. John Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy, chap. 3: "Towards the Absolute"; chap. 4: "Personality and the Absolute" (especially the latter).

b. Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, vol. viii, Part ii: "The Idealist Movement in Great Britain"; part iii: "Idealism in America" (especially chap. xxi: "The Philosophy of Royce").

c. Morton White, The Age of Analysis, chap. 1: "The Decline and Fall of the Absolute."

II. AMERICAN REALISM

1. E. B. Holt et. al., "The Program and Platform of Six Realists" in Klemke, Contemporary Analytic and Linguistic Philosophies, chap. 4.

2. Durant Drake, "The Approach to Critical Realism" in Klemke, ibid., chap. 5.

3. Paul Edwards Encyclopedia of Philosophy on Realism (R. J. Hirst).

4. John Dewey, "The Existence of the World as a Logical Problem" in Essays in Experimental Logic, (a critique of sensationalistic assumptions common to both the "new" and "critical" realists and others, especially, Bertrand Russell).

Historical Background:

i. John Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy, chap. 11: "The New Realists"; chap. 12: "Critical Realism and American Naturalism."

b. Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, vol. Viii, Part v: "The Revolt Against Idealism" (especially chap. xvii: "Realism in Britain and America," chap. xviii: "GE Moore and Analysis" and chap. xix: "Bertrand Russell."

c. W. T. Jones, A History of Western Philosophy, Chap. 3: "Moore and the Revival of Realism, “especially, pp. 107-115.

III. PRAGMATISM

1. John Dewey, "The Development of American Pragmatism" in Pragmatism: The Classic Writings, edited by H.S. Thayer, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1982, pp. 11-23. Also in Moser and Mulder, Contemporary Approaches to Philosophy.

2. Charles Sanders Peirce, "The Fixation of Belief," "How to Make Our Ideas Clear," "What Pragmatism Is" in Thayer, ibid (see also editor's Introduction, pp. 11-22, pp. 43-47). Also, for more clarifications of pragmatism by Peirce, see pp. 48-60 where he introduces the term "Pragmaticism." There are also adequate reprints of Peirce in Contemporary Analytic and Linguistic Philosophies, in Klemke, chap. 2: "How to Make Our Ideas Clear" and chap. 3: "Pragmaticism."

3. William James, "What Pragmatism Means," "Pragmatism's Conception of Truth," "The Tigers of India," "The Meaning of the Word `Truth'," in Thayer, ibid. Chaps. ix, x, xi, xii. (See also editor's Introduction pp. 123-130 and an interview statement on Pragmatism by William James on pp. 131-134).

4. John Dewey, "What Pragmatism Means by Practical," in Essays in Experimental Logic. (See also editor's Introduction to the selections from Dewey in Thayer, op. cit. pp. 253-261). See also Moser and Mulder, Contemporary Approaches to Philosophy, for Dewey, "The Development of American Pragmatism"; James "What Pragmatism Means,” Peirce, "What Pragmatism Is" and Lewis, "the Proper Method of Philosophy.”

5. C. I. Lewis, "A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori" in Thayer, op. cit. (See also editor's introduction pp. 361-363).

6. A. J. Ayer, Philosophy in the Twentieth Century, chap. iii, pp. 69-83 on William James and pp. 83-107 on C. I. Lewis.

7. Milton K. Munitz, Contemporary Analytic Philosophy, New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1981, chap. ii, "Belief, Inquiry, and Meaning" (mainly on Peirce with briefer discussions of James and Dewey).

8. Paul Edwards' Encyclopedia of Philosophy on Pragmatism (H.S. Thayer), Pierce (Murray G. Murphey); James (William James Earle), Dewey (Richard Bernstein), Pragmatic Theory of Truth (Gertrude Ezorsky), C. I. Lewis (E.M. Adams).

9. Kwasi Wiredu, Philosophy and an African Culture, chap. 10, section iii: "The Theory of Truth" (especially pages 157-161 on the pragmatic and coherence theories of truth).

Historical Background:

a. John Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy, chap. 5: "Pragmatism and its European Analogues."

b. Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, vol. viii, Part iv: "The Pragmatic Movement."

c H.S. Thayer, Meaning and Action: A Critical History of Pragmatism, part ii: "American Pragmatism" (especially chap. 1: "Charles Sanders Peirce"; chap. 2 "William James"; chap. 3: "John Dewey."

d. W. T. Jones, A History of Western Philosophy, pp. 34-64: "Dewey".

Comparison of Pragmatism with Logical Positivism:

a William P. Alston, "Pragmatism and the Verifiability Theory of Meaning," Philosophical Review, vol. vi, no. 5, Oct. 1955.

b Charles W. Morris, "The Concept of Meaning in Pragmatism and Logical Positivism" in his Logical Empiricism, Pragmatism and Scientific Empiricism (AMS Press, reprint of 1937 edition).

IV. WHAT IS ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY?

1. Brief Expository Characterizations:

a. Milton K. Munitz, Contemporary Analytic Philosophy, chap. 1.

b. E.D. Klemke, Contemporary Analytic and Linguistic Philosophies, general introduction pp. 15-20: "The Rise of Analytic Philosophy"; introduction to part 2: "Analytic and Linguistic Philosophies," pp. 111-119.

c. Samuel Enoch Stumpf, Philosophy: History and Problems, 4th edition, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1989, chap. 24: "Analytic Philosophy," (same material available in the same author's Socrates to Sartre, chap. 24.)

d. Morris Weitz, 20th Century Philosophy: The Analytic Tradition, general introduction, pp. 1-11. See also his article “Analysis, Philosophical” in Paul Edwards, ed., the Encycloprdia of Philosophy.

e. W. T. Jones, A History of Western Philosophy: the Twentieth Century to Wittgenstein and Sartre, pp.88-93.

1. More Detailed Expository and Critical Characterizations:

a. Anthony Quinton, "Contemporary British Philosophy" in D.J. O'Connor, ed., A Critical History of Western Philosophy, New York: The Free Press, 1964. See also his article on “British Philosophy” in Paul Edwards’ Encyclopedia of Philosophy, pp.395-396.

b. Ernest Nagel, Logic Without Metaphysics, Part I, chap. 9: "Impressions and Appraisals of Analytic Philosophy in Europe."

c. Blanshard, Reason and Analysis

d. Ernest Gellner, Words and Things, Boston: Beacon Press Hill, 1959, Chapter 1: "Of Linguistic Philosophy"

e. P. F. Strawson, Analysis and Metaphysics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992, "Analytic Philosophy: Two Analogies".

i. Richard Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982, Introduction: "Pragmatism and Philosophy" and chapter 12: "Philosophy in America Today." (Note: The first of these two articles is also in Moser and Mulder, Contemporary Approaches to Philosophy

1. Detailed Statements of Advocacy:

a. Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy, chap. xxxi: "The Philosophy of Logical Analysis" reprinted in Morton White, The Age of Analysis, pp. 194-203.

b. GE Moore, "A Defense of Common Sense" in E.D. Klemke, Contemporary Analytic and Linguistic Philosophies.

c. Gilbert Ryle, "Systematically Misleading Expressions" in Klemke, ibid.

d. Rudolf Carnap, "The Rejection of Metaphysics" in Morris Weitz, 20th Century Philosophy: The Analytic Tradition. reprinted in Morton White, The Age of Analysis, pp. 209-225.

e. Gustav Bergman, "Logical Positivism, Language, and Linguistic Philosophies." in Klemke, op. cit.

f. John Wisdom, Philosophical Perplexity in Klemke, ibid.

V. FREGE

His distinction between Concept and Object and his elucidation of the concept of existence; Application of the latter to the ontological argument for the existence of God.

His distinction between Sense and Reference; Relevance of this distinction to the contemporary theory of the identity of mental and brain processes.

1. Gottlob Frege, "On Sense and Meaning" in Geach and Black, ibid, reprinted in Blackman Classics of Analytical Metaphysics and also in Herbert Feigl and Wilfrid Sellars, Readings in Philosophical Analysis, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1949 or in Baillie, 1997, p.23ff.

2. Milton K. Munitz, ibid,. chap. iii, pp. 105-118.

3. J. J. C. Smart, "Sensations and Brian Processes" in V.C. Chappel, ed., The Philosophy of Mind, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1962 and reprinted in countless other anthologies. (Note the relevance of the sense and reference distinction to the Identity theory.)

4. Saul Kripke, "Identity and Necessity" in Baillie 1997 or Milton Munitz, Identity and Individuation, New York: New York University Press, 1971, 1980. Also reprinted in Stephen P. Schwartz, Naming, Necessity, and Natural Kinds, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977 and in Ted Honderich and Myles Burnyeat, Philosophy As It Is, New York: Viking Penguin Inc., 1979.(Note, particularly, Burnyeat's explanatory introduction to Kripke's discussion.)

5. Paul Edwards, Encyclopedia of Philosophy on Frege (Dummett): Referring (Leonard Linsky): Proper Names and Descriptions (John Searle).

Historical Background:

a. John Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy,. chap. 6: "New Developments in Logic," esp. pp. 147-155.

b. W. T. Jones, A history of Western Philosophy: The Twentieth century to Wittgenstein and Sartre, chapter 4: "Frege and the Revolution in Logic".

c.Rudolf Carnap, "The Old and the New Logic" in A. J. Ayer, ed., Logical Positivism.

VI RUSSELL

Logical Atomism; The Theory of Descriptions and Other Types of Analysis; Comparison of Russell and Frege on Reference; and Strawson's Critique of Russell's Theory of Descriptions and Russell's rejoinder.

1. Baillie, 1997, pp. 41- 71 OR Bertrand Russell, "Facts and Propositions," "Particulars, Predicates, and Relations," "Excursions into Metaphysics" in E.D. Klemke, Contemporary Analytic and Linguistic Philosophies, chap. 10-12.

2. Milton K. Munitz, Contemporary Analytic Philosophy, chap. 4.

3. J. O. Urmson, Philosophical Analysis, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 22-27 (on the theory of descriptions); pp. 27-44 (other types of analysis); chap. 9 (criticisms of logical atomism).

4. Bertrand Russell, "On Denoting," in Mind, vol, xiv, Oct. 1905, reprinted in H. Feigl and W. Sellars, Readings in Philosophical Analysis, New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts; or Blackman Classics of Analytical Metaphysics, or Robert Marsh, ed., Bertrand Russell: Logic and Knowledge, London, 1956.

5. P. F. Strawson, "On Referring," Mind 1950, reprinted in Herbert Feigl, Wilfrid Sellars, and Keith Lehrer, New Readings in Philosophical Analysis, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1972; Blackman, op.cit., and in Joseph Margolis et.al., An Introduction to Philosophical Inquiry.

6. Bertrand Russell, "Mr. Strawson on Referring," Mind 1957, reprinted in Feigl, Sellars, and Lehrer, New Readings; Blackman, op. cit.

7. A. J. Ayer, Philosophy in the Twentieth Century, chap 2, pp. 19-40: "Bertrand Russell."

8. Paul Edwards, Encyclopedia of Philosophy, on Russell (Paul Edwards, William P. Alston, and A.N. Prior); Referring (Leonard Linsky); Proper Names and Descriptions (John Searle); Analysis, Philosophical (Morris Weitz).

9. Arthur Jacobson, "Russell and Strawson on Referring" in E.D. Klemke, ed., Essays on Bertrand Russell, Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1970.

10. Herbert Hochberg, "Strawson, Russell, and the King of France" in Klemke, ibid.

11. Morris Weitz, 20th Century Philosophy: The Analytic Tradition, Chapter VII: Russell: Descriptions.

Historical Background:

a. John Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy, chap. 9: "Moore and Russell" (especially 213-239).

b. Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, vol. viii, part v, chaps. xix-xxi (especially xix).

c. W. T. Jones, A history of Western Philosophy, chapter 5: "Russell".

VII WITTGENSTEIN

His Early Philosophy:

1. Baillie 1997, a. “Introduction to Logical Positivism” b. Ayer, “The Elimination of Metaphysics,” c. Moritz Schlick, “The Foundation of Knowledge” & Milton K. Munitz, Contemporary Analytic Philosophy, chap. vi.

2. E.D. Klemke, Contemporary Analytic and Linguistic Philosophies, chaps. 13-17 (selections from Ayer's Language, Truth, and Logic).

3. J. O. Urmson, Philosophical Analysis, chaps. 7 and 8.

4. A. J. Ayer, Philosophy in the Twentieth Century, chap. iv, pp. 121-141.

5. A. J. Ayer, ed., Logical Positivism, editor's introductions.

6. Moritz Schlick, "The Turning Point in Philosophy" in Ayer, ibid.

7. Rudolf Carnap, "The Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language" in Ayer, ibid.

8. Carl G. Hempel, "The Empiricist Criterion of Meaning" in Ayer, ibid.

9. G. J. Warnock, "Verification and the Use of Language" in Paul Edwards and Arthur Pap, A Modern Introduction to Philosophy, New York: "The Free Press, 1973.

10. A.C. Ewing, "Meaninglessness," in Edwards and Pap, ibid., originally published in Mind, 1973.

11. Paul Edwards, Encyclopedia of Philosophy on Logical Positivism (John Passmore); "Verifiability Principle" (R.W. Ashby).

12. Morris Weitz, Chap. X: Carnap, "The Rejection of Metaphysics"; Chap. XI: Hans Hahn, "Logic, Metaphysics and Knowledge of Nature"; Chap. XIV: Urmson, "Logical Positivism and Analysis"

Historical Background:

a. John Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy, chap. 16: "Logical Positivism."

b. Rudolf Carnap, "The Old and the New Logic" in A. J. Ayer, ed., Logical Positivism.

c. Ernest Nagel, "Impressions and Appraisals of Analytic Philosophy in Europe" in his Logic Without Metaphysics (especially pp. 216-241).

d. R.W. Ashby, "Logical Positivism" in D.J. O'Connor, A Critical History of Western Philosophy, New York: The Free Press, 1964.

e. W. T. Jones, A History of Western Philosophy, chap. 7: "Logical Positivism."

IX. WITTGENSTEIN’S LATER PHILOSOPHY

1. Baillie 1997, chap 5 (Selections from Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations) & Milton Munitz, op. cit., chap. vii.

2. A. J. Ayer, op. cit., chap. v, pp. 142-156: "The Later Wittgenstein."

3. Paul Edwards, op. cit., on Wittgenstein (Norman Malcolm): "Private Language Problem" (Hector-Neri Castaneda).

4. Clyde Laurence Hardin, "Wittgenstein on Private Languages" in E.D. Klemke, ed., Essays on Wittgenstein, Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1971 (a guarded criticism of Wittgenstein on Private Languages).

5. Newton Garver, "Wittgenstein on Private Language" in Klemke, ibid. (an approving exposition of Wittgenstein's criticisms of the idea of a private language).

Historical Background:

a. John Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy, chap. 15: "Some Cambridge Philosophers" (especially pp. 350-365 on Wittgenstein's early philosophy); chap. 18: "Wittgenstein and Ordinary Language Philosophy" (especially pp. 424-437 on Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy).

b. Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, vol. viii, pp. 495-509 (Epilogue to part v).

c. W. T. Jones, A history of Western Philosophy, chap. 11: "The Later Wittgenstein".

PART II:

X. CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS IN ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY

Introductory

. John. R Searle, “Contemporary Philosophy in the United States” in Nicholas Bunnin and E. P. Tsui-James, eds., The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy (Blackwell, 1996)

. Bernard Williams, “Contemporary Philosophy: A Second Look,” ibd.

New Thinking about the Analytic, the Necessary and the A priori

1. W. V. Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" in Baillie 1997 or Klemke 2000.

2. Saul Kripke, “A Priori Knowledge, Necessity, and Contingency” in Paul. K. Moser & Arnold vander Nat, eds., Human Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Approaches (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995) or Paul K. Moser, ed., A Priori Knowledge, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986.

3. Milton Munitz, Contemporary Analytic Philosophy, chap. viii.

4. A. J. Ayer, Philosophy in the Twentieth Century, pp. 242-252 on Quine; pp. 265-276 on Kripke.

Ideal Language Philosophy

1. W. V. Quine, "On What There Is" in E.D. Klemke, ed., Contemporary Analytic and Linguistic Philosophies.

2. Gustav Bergmann, “Logical Positivism, Language and the Reconstruction of Metaphysics” in Klemke, op. cit.

3. Irving Copi, “Language Analysis and Metaphysical Inquiry” in Richard Rorty, ed., The Linguistic Turn.

4. Gustav Bergmann, “Two Criteria for an Ideal Language”, ibid.

5. Irving Copi, “Reply to Bergmann,” ibid.

Note: the historical role models in this style of analytic philosophy are Frege and Russell as studied above.

Informal Language Analysis

1. Baillie 1997, Chap. 5: Editor’s Introductions to Moore, Ryle and Austin.

2. G. E. Moore, “Proof of an External World,” ibid

3. Gilbert Ryle, “Knowing How and Knowing That,” ibid.

4. J. L. Austin, (Selections from Sense and Sensibilia), ibid.

Ontological Discussions in Analytic Philosophy

1. Rudolf Carnap, “Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology” in Baillie, 1997 or Paul Moser and Dwayne Mulder, Contemporary Approaches to Philosophy.

2. W. V. Quine, “Semantic Ascent” in Word and Object. Reprinted in Moser and Mulder, op. cit.

3. W. V. Quine, “On What There Is” in Klemke, op. Cit.

4. Kwasi Wiredu, “Logic and Ontology”, Second Order, Series I - IV

More Recent Developments

1. Donald Davidson, “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme” in Inquiries into Truth & Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984).

2. Michael Dummett, “Can Analytic Philosophy be Systematic and Should it be?” in Moser and Mulder op. cit.

3. Richard Rorty, “Pragmatism and Philosophy” in Moser and Mulder, ibid.

4. Hilary Putnam, “Why is a Philosopher?”

Class Attendance Policy

Class attendance is mandatory. If you miss a class for whatever reason, it is your responsibility to find out what went on in the class, especially regarding any assignments that may have been given.

Course Requirements

There will be one major and one other written assignment in the form of a take-home examination. The major assignment will be a research paper of not less than 7 ½ pages typed in single spacing or 15 pages in double spacing in the case of undergraduates and 10 pages in single spacing or 20 in double spacing pages in the case of graduate students. This will be due by the middle of the term. The take-home questions will require short answers. Graduate students will, of course, be held to higher qualitative standards. .

Grading

The major writing assignment will account for 50% of the final grade and the take-home exam the remaining 50%. In grading written work I will look for knowledge of the literature, ability to argue, correctness and clarity of expression and independence of mind.

Within three or so weeks there will be an examination designed to test your understanding of what is going on in the course. The grade for that test will not be factored into the final grade for the course unless it is to an individual’s advantage.