DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA

PHI 6305: EPISTEMOLOGY SEMINAR

Spring 2004 Kwasi Wiredu

OBJECTIVE

A critical investigation of epistemological problems and theories.

BOOKS

(a) Required:

Louis P. Pojman, The Theory of Knowledge, Belmont, CA: 3rd Edition, 2003

Some useful books:

(1) Paul K. Moser, Empirical Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology, Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1986.

(2) Jonathan Dancy, Perceptual Knowledge, New York: Oxford University Press, 1988.

(3) Paul K. Moser, A Priori Knowledge, New York: Oxford University Press, 1987.

(4) John Pollock, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1986.

(5) Keith Lehrer, Theory of Knowledge, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1990.

TOPICS AND READINGS

I. The Problem of Skepticism

(a) Exposition and Critical Evaluation of Skepticism in Western Philosophy in its Greek Origins

(1) Richard H Popkin, "Skepticism" in Paul Edwards, The Encyclopedia of Philosophy

(2) Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism in Paul K. Moser, and Arnold vander Nat, Human Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Approaches, New York: Oxford University Press, 1987.

(3) Augustine, Selections in Moser and vander Nat, ibid

(4) Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, New York: Doubleday & Co. (Image Books) 1962, Vol. 1, pp. 413 - 417, 442 - 445.

(5) W. T. Jones, A History of Western Philosophy: Vol.1, The Classical Mind, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, pp. 347 - 353.

(6) Christopher Kirwan, "Augustine Against the Skeptics" in Myles Burnyeat, ed., The Skeptical Tradition, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983.

(7) C. B. Schmitt, The Rediscovery of Ancient Skepticism in Modern Times" in Burnyeat, ibid.

(b) Survey and Critical Appraisal of the Approaches to Skepticism in Classical Rationalism and Empiricism and in Contemporary Theories of Knowledge

(1) Descartes, Hume, in Pojman 2003, Part II

(2) Copleston, A History of Philosophy, Vol. 4, chapters 2 and 3 and 149 - 152 (on Descartes); Vol. 5, chapters xiv and xv and pp.391 -394 or, if you like, the whole of chapter xviii of which the last pages cited are a part. (These are on Hume.)

(3) W. T. Jones, A History of Western Philosophy, First edition, chapters 23 (Descartes) and 28 (Hume) Or see corresponding parts of the second edition.

(4) Bernard Williams, "Descartes' Use of Skepticism" in Burnyeat, The Skeptical Tradition.

(5) Robert J. Fogelin, "The Tendency of Hume's Skepticism" in Burnyeat, ibid.

Note: There are two very useful articles on Rationalism and Empiricism, the first by Bernard Williams and the second by D. W. Hamlyn in Paul Edwards' The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Williams also wrote the piece on Descartes in that reference work. You might also like to read the article on Hume by D. G. C. MacNabb in the same work.

(c) Approaches to Skepticism in Contemporary Theories of Knowledge:

(1) Keith Lehrer, "The Problem of Knowledge and Skepticism" in James W. Cornman, Keith Lehrer and George S. Pappas, Philosophical Problems and Arguments, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., Third edition, 1987.

(2) Keith Lehrer, Theory of Knowledge, chapter 9: "Skepticism".

(3) Peter Unger, "A Defense of Skepticism", Philosophical Review, Vol. 80, 1971. Reprinted in Lowell Kleiman & Stephen Lewis, Philosophy: An Introduction through Literature, New York: Paragon House, 1990.

(4) Robert Nozick, "Knowledge and Skepticism", in Dancy, ed. Perceptual Knowledge

(5) Jonathan Dancy, Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology, New York: Basil Blackwell, 1985, chapter 1.

(6) John Pollock, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, pp. 3 - 7: "Skeptical Problems"

(7) J. L. Austin, Extracts from his Sense and Sensibilia, in Harrison and Bowie, Op.cit. under the title "Ordinary Language and Philosophical Doubt".

(8) Milton K. Munitz, Contemporary Analytic Philosophy, New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1981, pp.321 - 348: "Common sense and Certainty: A Critique of G. E. Moore" (by Ludwig Wittgenstein). Munitz gives an account of Wittgenstein's criticisms of Moore's views on questions of doubt and certainty with copious quotations from both.

(9) Chisholm in Pojman 2003, Part 1, and Moore, Lehrer and Malcolm in Part II

(d) Skepticism in Connection with Induction

(1) Hume, Russell, Will, Reichenbach, Strawson, Goodman in Pojman 2003.

(2) Bonjour 2002, chap. 4

(3) Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy, Chap XVII, pp. 664-674

(4) Wesley Salmon, “Unfinished Business: The Problem of Induction,” in Martin Curd, Argument and Analysis: An Introduction to Philosophy.

(5) Kwasi Wiredu, Philosophy and an African Culture, pp. 165-170

II The Analysis of Knowledge

What is it that the skeptic and the non-skeptic are arguing about? Knowledge, of course. But what is knowledge? Justified true belief? So it was supposed by many until Gettier's article to the contrary.

Desideratum: A Critical and Constructive Examination of Recent Analyses of Knowledge in the Light of Gettier.

(1) Gettier, Feldman, Goldman, Lehrer and Paxton and Goldman (again) in Pojman 2003

(2) Gilbert Harman, "Knowledge and Explanation"

(3) Roderick Chisholm, "Knowledge as Justified True Belief"

(4) Robert Shope, "Knowledge and Falsity"

NOTE: 2, 3 and 4 are available in Moser, ed., Empirical Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology.

(5) John Pollock, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, Appendix: "The Gettier Problem"

(7) Robert Nozick, "Knowledge and Skepticism", in Dancy, ed., Perceptual Knowledge

(8) Jonathan Dancy, Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology, chapters 2 (Knowledge) and 3 (The Conditional Theory of Knowledge).

(9) William W. Rozeboom, "Why I Know So Much More Than You Do", American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 4, 1967. Reprinted in Michael D. Roth and Leon Galis, ed. Knowing: Essays in the Analysis of Knowledge, New York: University Press of America, Second edition, 1984.

(10) J. D. O'Connor and Brian Carr, Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982, chap. III: “The Analysis of Knowledge”

III Theories of Justification

Assume, for the purposes of argument, that justified true belief does not necessarily amount to knowledge. Even so justified true belief is humanly precious enough. Indeed, if we consider how philosophically enigmatic the concept of truth seems to be, it may well be considered a substantial enough objective to seek an account of justified belief. Much effort in contemporary epistemology has been devoted to this aim. Three of the contending theories resulting from this effort are foundationalism, coherentism and reliabilism. These are the most widely canvassed theories at present. Of these foundationalism, a theory that has both a rationalist and an empiricist ancestry, is the most time-honored, though not necessarily the most time protected, and the others are in some measure reactions to it. The literature for these theories is, accordingly, intermingled.

(a) Foundationalism

What exactly is foundationalism? What are the arguments pro and con? What are your own views on the issues involved and your reasons?

(1) William P. Alston, "Concepts of Epistemic Justification"

(2) Roderick Chisholm, "The Myth of the Given"

(3) William Alston, "Two Types of Foundationalism"

(4) Laurence Bonjour, "Can Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation?" Also in Pojman 2003. (This is a critique of Foundationalism, but see Lawrence BonJour, Epistemology: Classical Problems and Contemporary Responses, New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002, Chap. 9 for a mellowed approach to Foundationalism.)

(5) C. I Lewis, "The Justification of Empirical Beliefs" reprinted from his Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation (La Salle. Illinois: Open Court Publishing Co. 1946) in William Alston and Richard B. Brandt, eds. The Problems of Philosophy, Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., Second edition, 1978. Reprinted also in Joseph Margolis, eds. An Introduction to Philosophical Inquiry, New York: Alfred Knopf, Second edition, 1978 under the title "The Basis of Empirical Knowledge".

(6) David B. Annis, "A Contextualist Theory of Epistemic Justification" (Contextualism is a theory of justification alternative to foundationalism, coherentism and reliabilism. For the sake of programmatic economy, we will only take cognizance of it in relation to the consideration of the other theories.)

NOTE: All the above readings, except Lewis’, are available in Moser, Empirical Knowledge.

(7) Keith Lehrer, Theory of Knowledge, Chapters 3: "The Foundation Theory: Infallible Foundations" and 4: "Fallible Foundations"

(8) John Pollock, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, chapter 2: "Foundation Theories"

(9 Jonathan Dancy, Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology, chapter 4:"Foundationalism"

(10) Chisholm, Sosa, Audi, BonJour, McGrew, and Haack in Pojman.

(b) Coherentism

Critical Analysis and Evaluation of Coherentism

Contemporary advocates of coherentism distinguish between a coherence theory of truth and a coherence theory of justification. It is the latter rather than the former that they have usually wanted to defend. But this implies a general distinction between the theory of truth and the theory of justification, which needs to be scrutinized as a preliminary to the analysis and evaluation of contemporary coherentism. Whether one is dealing with the coherence theory of truth or of coherence, the crucial problem concerns the precise definition and logical delineation of the concept of coherence. How, for example, is coherence related to the notions of the validity, soundness or degree of strength of an argument?

(1) William P. Alston, "Concepts of Epistemic Justification" in Moser, Empirical Knowledge

(2) Laurence Bonjour, "The Coherence Theory of Empirical Knowledge", ibid. (This is a defense of coherentism, but see Lawrence BonJour, Epistemology: Classical Problems and Contemporary Responses, New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002, Chap. 9 for a recantation.)

(3) Ernest Sosa, "The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence versus Foundations in the theory of Knowledge", ibid. Also in Pojman 2003

(4) Gilbert Harman, "Positive Vs Negative Undermining in Belief Revision", Nous, vol. 18, 1984. Reprinted in Daniel Kolak and Raymond Martin, The Experience of Philosophy, Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1989.

(5) Keith Lehrer, Theory of Knowledge, chapters 5: "The Explanatory Coherence Theory": "Internal Coherence and Personal Justification" and 7: "Coherence, Truth and Undefeated Justification", especially, 5 & 7.

(6) John Pollock, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, chapter, 3: "Coherence Theories"

(7) Jonathan Dancy, Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology, chapter. 8: "Coherence Theories" and 9: "Coherence, Justification and Knowledge". (See also Pojman 2003)

(8) Fumerton, Haack, and Annis in Pojman 2003.

(c) Reliabilism

This is the third main theory of Justification. Wanted: Exposition, critical analysis and evaluation of the theory. An extremely urgent question here is as to how truth and justification are related to reliability. A similar urgency attaches to the need to evaluate the externalism internal to reliabilism; which brings us to the contemporary controversy between internalism and externalism in epistemology.

(1) Goldman, Lehrer, Quine, Conee and Feldman, Steup, Kornlith, Lewis, and Greco in Pojman 2003.

(2) John L. Pollock, "Reliability and Justified Belief", ibid.

(3) R. Nozick, "Knowledge and Skepticism" in Jonathan Dancy, Perceptual Knowledge,

(4) Alvin I. Goldman, "Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge", ibid.

(5) D. M. Armstrong, "The Infinite Regress of Reasons", (Extracts from Armstrong's Belief, Truth and Knowledge, reprinted in Daniel Kolak and Raymond Martin, The Experience of Philosophy)

(6) Keith Lehrer, Theory of Knowledge, Chapter 8: "Externalism and Epistemology Naturalized"

(7) John L. Pollock, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, chapters 4: "Externalism" and 5: "Epistemic Norms"

IV Truth

The question of Truth came up in connection with the distinction usually made by contemporary coherentists between a theory of truth and a theory of justification, with its implied distinction between truth and justification. This distinction is, in fact, denied in the pragmatic theory of truth. For this reason alone, it is important to give extended attention to the pragmatic theory. But the prominence of quasi-pragmatic talk in recent philosophy makes this all the more necessary. An examination of the pragmatic theory should, however, be in the context of a general examination of the `traditional' theories of truth. We must, accordingly, take a good look at the correspondence and coherence theories of truth along with the pragmatic theory. Recently, epistemologists have been developing an unfortunate habit of ignoring the problem of truth. This may be due to a distinction between Knowledge and truth that makes an epistemic issue and truth a logical or metaphysical one. Thus our text, which is supposed to be a comprehensive text on contemporary epistemology does not spare any space for Truth. The same disinterest is evident in many other contemporary texts on epistemology. The least we can do, is, I think, to examine carefully the question whether truth is an epistemic question or not.

Wanted: A critical and constructive discussion of the traditional theories of truth.

(1) F. H. Bradley, a Coherence Theory of Truth (Extracts from his Essays on Truth and Reality reprinted in, James A. Gould, Classic Philosophic Questions, chapter 25,

(2) William James, Pragmatism (Extracts from his Pragmatism in Gould, ibid, chapter 26

(3) Bertrand Russell, The Correspondence theory of Truth (Extracts from his The Problems of Philosophy in Gould, ibid, chapter 24.

(4) John Dewey, "A Short Catechism Concerning Truth" in his The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy and Other Essays in Contemporary Thought, Indiana University Press, [1910], 1965.

(5) J.L. Austin, "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary volume XXIV, 1950

(6) Carl G. Hempel, "On the Logical Positivist's Theory of Truth", Analysis, Vol. 2 No. 4, 1935.

(7) Brand Blanshard, The Nature of Thought, London: Allen and Unwin, 1939) Vol 2, chapters 25 - 27.

(8) Kwasi Wiredu, Philosophy and An African Culture, chapter 10, section iii, pp. 153 - 161: "The Theory of Truth". See also chapter 12: "Truth, A Dialogue". Both chapters 8: "Truth as Opinion" and 9: "In Defense of Opinion" might also possibly be found of some interest.

(9) Kwasi Wiredu, "The Correspondence Theory of Judgement", African Philosophical Inquiry, Vol.1, No. 1, 1987.

Note: Paul Edward's Encyclopedia of Philosophy, contains three very good articles on the traditional theories of truth. The article on the "Correspondence Theory of Truth" is by A. N. Prior, the one on the "Coherence theory of Truth" by Alan White and the one on the "Pragmatic Theory of Truth" by Gertrude Ezorsky.

V. Relativism

Whatever truth may be, it is obvious that we cannot even begin to talk of the knowledge of truth without presupposing some conceptual framework. But suppose that conceptual frameworks differ from culture to culture or, within the same culture, from epoch to epoch and within the same culture and epoch from person to person. Then, conceivably, the notion of reality might be relative to these parameters and so also the criteria for apprehending reality. An important implication of such relativity is the inappropriateness of evaluations across the parameters. These remarks relate to what is known as conceptual relativism. But, of course, a more directly doxastic relativism is possible. Moreover, relativity might be envisaged with respect not only to cultures or epochs but even to individuals. It should be noted also that there is cognitive relativism and there is moral relativism. Here our direct interest is in the former.

Contemporary interest in relativism derives from both anthropological and methodological or epistemological considerations. The first kind of concern is apparent in Winch's contribution below while the second is manifested in most of the readings. Other concerns, such as in the case of Rorty, would seem to be due to somewhat unpredictable forms of soul-searching.

Project: Carefully explain what relativism consists in. Is it coherent? Is it valid? Give a rigorous analysis and evaluation of theories on this subject known to you. Be sure, also, to investigate the epistemological relevance of relativism. In discussing this it will be useful to take account of the social character of the acquisition of knowledge.

(1) Peter Winch, "Understanding a Primitive Society", American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 1, 1964. Reprinted in Bryan Wilson, Rationality, Oxford: Blackwell, 1974.

(2) Nelson Goodman, "The Fabrication of Facts", from his Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1978 reprinted in Michael Krausz and Jack W. Meiland, Relativism: Cognitive and Moral, Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 1982.

(3) Maurice Mandelbaum, "Subjective, Objective and Conceptual Relativisms" in Krausz and Meiland, ibid.

(4) Donald Davidson, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association, 47 (1973 - 74). Reprinted in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford, The Clarendon 1984) and in Krausz and Meiland, op. cit., and also in Moser and vander Nat, eds. Human Knowledge.

(5) Alasdair MacIntyre, "Relativism, Power and Philosophy", Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical association, 1985. Reprinted in Michael Krausz, ed., Relativism: Interpretation and Confrontation, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989.

(6) Richard Rorty, "Solidarity or Objectivity?" in Krausz, op. cit.

(7) Hilary Putnam, "Why Reason Can't be naturalized", in Realism and Reason, vol. 3 of his Philosophical Papers, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983. Reprinted in Moser and vander Nat, eds. Op. cit., especially pp. 358 - 362

(8) Kwasi Wiredu, Philosophy and An African Culture, chapter 12: "Truth, A Dialogue", pp. 216 - 232.

(9) Kwasi Wiredu, "Are There Cultural Universals?” Paper presented at the 18th World Congress of Philosophy, Brighton, U. K. August 1988. Published in Quest: An International African Journal of Philosophy, Vol.IV, No. 2, 1990.

(10) Kwasi Wiredu, "Knowledge Truth and Fallibility", Philosophical Association of Turkey Conference, 1989, especially, pp. 1 - 17.

VI. A Priori Knowledge

There is a set of three distinctions that have played an enormous role in Western Epistemology. They are the distinctions between the analytic and the synthetic, the a priori and the a posteriori, the necessary and the contingent. Kant, to whom is due the analytic-synthetic terminology, used these distinctions in sharpening his formulation of the problem to which he devoted the first part of The Critique of Pure Reason. The problem was How are synthetic a priori truths possible (in mathematics, natural science and metaphysics)? Kant maintained, of course, that there are synthetic a priori truths. But this has been a bone of contention between Kantians and rationalists, on the one hand -- Kant, by the way, was part rationalist, part empiricist and part something else altogether -- and empiricists, on the other. As a rule empiricists have tended to deny the possibility of synthetic a priori propositions or synthetic necessary ones, which Kant also recognized.

In spite of this disagreement, however, the following were accepted pretty much on all hands until quite recently. (1) All necessary propositions are a priori and all a priori propositions are necessary. (2) All a posteriori propositions are contingent and all contingent propositions are a posteriori. It was also very widely supposed that propositions that are analytic or a priori or necessary had a certainty superior to that to which any a posteriori or contingent proposition could have pretensions. (Kant called that alleged species of certainty apodeictic.) All these claims have, however, been questioned by Kripke with the forcefulness of a rare genius, and the book A Priori Knowledge, edited by Moser, bears ample testimony to the resulting stir. Superlative talent in philosophy is, however, not synonymous with infallibility, and all the issues involved should be critically scrutinized.

Two earlier unorthodoxies need to be noted. John Stuart Mill, almost alone among empiricists, denied that there are any a priori or necessary propositions. Contemporary empiricists have been loth to follow Mill in this. (See, for example, Ayer in the selection below.) Was Mill wrong-headed in this matter? Please, investigate.

A no less revolutionary contrariness was displayed by Quine when he denied, not just the existence of analytic or a priori propositions but the coherence of the distinction itself between the analytic and the synthetic and between the priori and the a posteriori. Quine, for a change, accommodated necessary propositions but studiously worked out an empirical content for that category. The controversy which Quine's intervention precipitated in its own time has not quite died down to this day, and the issues involved too need to be gone into. It would also be interesting to critically compare and contrast Quine with Mill on the matter in hand.

Wanted: A critical and constructive treatment of the issues raised above and any related ones.

(1) Plato, Selections from the Meno in Paul Edwards and Arthur Pap, eds. A Modern Introduction to Philosophy, New York: the Free Press, Third edition, 1973.

(2) G. W. Leibniz, "Necessary Truth and the Natural Light within Us" in Edwards and pap, ibid.

(3) Immanuel Kant, Introduction to The Critique of Pure Reason, in Edwards and Pap. See also Pojman 2003

(4) John Stuart Mill, "Mathematics and Experience" Selections from Mill's A System of Logic, in Edwards and Pap, ibid.

(5)Bertrand Russell, "On Our Knowledge of General Principles", Selections from his Problems of Philosophy in Edwards and Pap.

(6) A. J. Ayer, "The A Priori", chapter 5 of his Language, Truth and Logic in Edwards and Pap, ibid. Also in Moser, ed., A Priori Knowledge. Also in Pojman 2003.

(7) A. C. Ewing, "The `A Priori' and the Empirical" from chapter 2 of his The Fundamental Questions of Philosophy reprinted in Edwards and Pap. See also Pojman 2003.

See also Pap's introduction to the section on Priori Knowledge in Edwards and Pap ibid. from which these references have been taken.

(9) C. I. Lewis, "A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori"

(10) W. V. Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" in Pojman 2003

(11) W. V. O. Quine, "Necessary Truth", in his The Ways of Paradox, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1976.

(12) H. P. Grice and P. F. Strawson, "In Defense of a Dogma" The Philosophical Review, Vol. 65, 1956. Reprinted in J. F. Harris and R. H. Severens, Analyticity: Selected Readings, Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970. Also in Pojman 2003.

(13) Saul A. Kripke, "A Priori Knowledge, Necessity and Contingency" Also in Pojman 2003.

(14) Albert Casullo, "Kripke on the A Priori and the Necessary"

Note: (9)-(14) are reprinted in Moser, A Priori Knowledge. All the remaining articles in this book are relevant and may be consulted if possible.

(15) Anthony Quinton, "The A Priori and the Analytic", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. 64 (1963-4). Reprinted in P. F. Strawson, Philosophical Logic, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967.

(16) Jonathan Dancy, Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology, chapter 14: "A Priori Knowledge".

(17) Kwasi Wiredu, "Kant's Synthetic A Priori in Geometry and the Rise of Non-Euclidean Geometries", Kant-Studien, January, 1970

(18) Kwasi Wiredu, "Knowledge, Truth and Fallibility" in I. Kucuradi and R. S. Cohen, eds. The Concept of Knowledge, Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995, Section 4: "A Humanized Conception of A Priori Knowledge"

(19) D. W. Hamlyn has three excellent articles in Paul Edward's Encyclopedia of Philosophy, that are very relevant to the present topic. They are (a) "Analytic and Synthetic Statements", (b) "A Priori and A Posteriori" and (c) "Contingent and Necessary Statements". The same encyclopedia also contains a useful article on the "Linguistic Theory of the A Priori" by R. W. Ashby.

(20) Roderick Chisholm, “Truths of Reason” in Pojman 2003

VI. Naturalization of Epistemology

The question of the naturalization of epistemology is a special case of a very general question of philosophical method. In one formulation one might put it as "How is philosophy related to science?" A broader formulation would be to ask how philosophy is related to factual information. In the specific case of the naturalizing movement in contemporary epistemology the question raised has been "How is epistemology related to psychology?" And the answer that the proponents of this brand of epistemology have proposed is that epistemological questions cannot be answered independently of psychological information. More radically, Quine, a leading influence in this type of epistemology, has seemed to suggest that epistemology itself metamorphoses through naturalization into a psychological discipline. Still the problem is to give a clear characterization of the peculiar nature of epistemological problems and their mode of possible solution; for, even if epistemology becomes, in the words of Quine, a `chapter of psychology', we still need to differentiate that chapter from other chapters of the discipline.

Although, the phrase `the naturalization of Epistemology' is recent, the idea is not so new. David Hume, for example, in contending that all reasoning from experience is founded on a natural principle of animal existence, which he called `custom', was naturalizing epistemology. I have explained this in chapter 10, section IV: "Philosophical Methods" (pp.162-171 in Philosophy and An African Culture, though I use there the term `genetic' rather than `naturalized' to characterize the epistemology in question. I also there explain that Dewey's epistemology was of the naturalized variety. Indeed, Dewey's approach was more thoroughly naturalistic than that of most contemporary naturalists, for he maintained that even logic is naturalistic. Of course, Dewey himself did not call his theory naturalized, he called it naturalistic, which brings us to the fact that the issue confronting us under this topic is, in fact the issue of naturalism in epistemology and in philosophy in general.

Naturalism in epistemology is not the same as empiricism, though Hume was both a naturalist and an empiricist. Please, compare and contrast the two kinds of theory.

What exactly, then, is `naturalized epistemology'? Explain and critically examine proposals in that theoretic direction.

(1) David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding (many editions) Section 8: "Of the Reason of Animals"

(2) John Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (Henry Holt, 1938), chapter 2: "The existential Matrix of Inquiry: Biological".

(3) Hilary Kornblith, ed., Naturalizing Epistemology, Cambridge, Massachusetts, The MIT Press, 1985, Introduction: "What is Naturalistic Epistemology?"

(4) W. V. O. Quine, "Epistemology Naturalized" in Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York: Columbia University Press, 1969. Reprinted in Kornblith, op. cit. Also in Moser and vander Nat, eds. Empirical Knowledge. Also in Pojman 2003

(5) Hilary Putnam, "Why Reason Can't be Naturalized" in his Realism and Reason: Philosophical Papers, Vol. 3, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983. Reprinted in Moser and vander Nat, eds. op.cit.

(6) Philip Kitcher, "A Priori Knowledge", in Kornblith, op. cit. Also in Moser, ed., A Priori Knowledge

(7) Alvin Goldman, "Epistemics: The Regulative Theory of Cognition" in Kornblith, op. cit. Also in Moser and vander Nat, op. cit.

(8) Hilary Kornblith, "Beyond Foundationalism and the Coherence Theory" in Kornblith, op. cit.

(9) Barry Stroud, "The Significance of Naturalized Epistemology" in Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. VI, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981. Also in Kornblith, op. cit.

(10) Kwasi Wiredu, Philosophy and An African Culture, Cambridge University Press, 1981, pp. 162-171

(11) Jaegwon Kim, “What is ‘Naturalized Epistemology’” in Jack S. Crumley II, Readings in Epistemology, Mountain View, CA: Mayfield Publishing Company, 1999. Also in Sven Bernecker and Fred Dretske, Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology Oxford, 2000.

VII. Anti-Realism

The question of anti-realism, as it has become a matter of current interest, is whether we can speak of realities that exist independently of our knowledge. Dummett is the contemporary philosopher most often associated with the negative answer to this question. That answer is what is currently known as anti-realism. The verificationism associated with the logical positivists is an earlier theory to which anti-realism has some affinities. But there are also important differences. An effort should be made to be clear about both the affinities and the differences.

The issue of realism and its contraries is, of course, not new in philosophy, but contemporary discussions of the issue have the peculiarity that they are usually couched in terms of the concerns of the philosophy of language or of the philosophy of logic. Dummett is very deliberate about this because he believes that developing our considerations from these levels is the most promising way of proceeding to their broader (i. e. metaphysical and epistemological) dimensions. Certainly, he has been very mindful of those larger dimensions. Our interest is, of course, primarily epistemological, but it would be easier for a donkey to race through the hole of a needle than to separate completely the epistemological from the logical and semantical aspects of the matter.

Endeavor, then, while not ignoring the logical and semantical issues, to bring out their epistemological significance. Give a clear and ample explanation of what anti-realism is about and provide a reasoned evaluation of the case for and against it. Don't forget to compare and contrast anti-realism with verificationism. Also endeavor to compare and contrast Dummett's `anti-realism' with Putnam's `internal realism' and give a reasoned evaluation of both.

(1) Moritz Schlick, "Positivism and Realism", in A.J. Ayer, ed., Logical Positivism, The free press, 1959.

(2) Carl G. Hempel, "The Empiricist Criterion of Meaning" in Ayer, ibid. Also in Moser and vander Nat, Empirical Knowledge

(3) Paul Marhenke, "the Criterion of Significance", Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 1950. Reprinted in L. Linsky, Semantics and the Philosophy of Language, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1952.

(4) J. L. Evans, "On Meaning and Verification", Mind, 1953. Reprinted in G. H. R. Parkinson, The Theory of Meaning, Oxford: Oxford University Press,

(5) Jonathan Dancy, Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology, chapter 6: "Empiricist Theories of Meaning"

(6) Michael Dummett, "Realism" in his Truth and Other Enigmas, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1978.

(7) Michael Dummett, "Realism and the Theory of Meaning" in The Logical Basis of Metaphysics (Harvard U.P, 1991)

(8) Crispin Wright, "Realism, Antirealism, Irrealism, Quasi-Realism" in Peter French et al., Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol XII, 1988. (Many of the articles in this

(9) Anthony Appiah, For Truth in Semantics, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 1986, esp. pp. 17-53.

(10) Hilary Putnam, The Many Faces of Realism, LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court, 1987, Lectures 1 & 2.

(11) Curtis Brown, "Internal Realism: Transcendental Idealism?" in Peter French et al., op.cit. (There are a number of other relevant articles in this volume.)

(12) W. V. O. Quine, The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1976, Chapter 9: "The Limits of Knowledge."

(13) Kwasi Wiredu, Philosophy and An African Culture, London, Cambridge University Press, 1980, chapter 9: "To Be Is To Be Known".

REQUIREMENTS

(1) Each student will be required to make a class presentation. The paper to be presented should be at least 15 pages long, typed in double-spacing (in 12 font). In the actual presentation the student will be expected to read a summary of the paper. The long paper will have to be made available to the entire class at least 24 hours before class time.

(2) There will also be a take-home exam in which three questions not overlapping with one’s presentation will be answered. The length required will be 7 pages, typed in Double-spacing.

The presentation will account for 50% of the overall grade and the rest for the remaining 50%.